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INTRODUCTION 
This Communication comes at a  defining moment in  the development of the European Union. 
Within a couple of months, the European Union will decide on which countries will participate in 
Economic and Mon«ary Union from the starting date of 1 January 1999.  This decision will be 
based on convergence reports currently under preparation in  the Commission and the European 
Monetary Institute and on a recommendation from the Commission.  As a consequence, the present 
Communication,  which,  this  year,  replaces  the  traditional  Annual  Economic  Report,  does  not 
analyse the convergence issue.  Instead, it focuses on the current economic situation, examines the 
main challenges in the years to come and suggests where the main priorities for poiicies should lie. 
Its main purpose is to initiate a debate in the European Parliament and the Member States on the 
policy options  to  be  considered  in  the  forthcoming  1998  Broad  Guidelines  for  the  economic 
policies of  the Member States and the Community. These Broad Guidelines will be the first after 
the initial list of  participants in EMU has been decided upon and will put a particular emphasis on 
growth and employment. 
1.  ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OUTLOOK 
1.1.  The present recovery in a longer-term penpective 
In the EU, the renewed upturn which begun in the spring of 1996 is  gathering momentum and is 
expected to turn into a self-sustaining expansion.  The rebound was initially driven by buoyant 
export demand from outside the European Union and a marked  improvement in competitiveness 
due  to  a  lower  exchange  rate  against  the  dollar,  moderate  wage  developments  and  on-going 
productivity  increases.  Given  improved competitiveness and  assuming that the expected strong 
export market growth materialises, exports will remain supportive over the short run. 
In the years ahead, the growth impulses are expected to stem increasingly from domestic demand, 
in  response to favourable monetary conditions, especially declining risk  premiums  in  long-term 
interest rates and the strength of the dollar against European currencies, and improved confidence 
of companies and households.  These favourable monetary conditions were brought about by the 
remarkable  progress  towards  convergence  of inflation  rates  and  the  correction  of excessive 
budgetary positions in the vast majority of  Member States. 
Investment is poised to become the engine of  growth in the Union, thereby adding to total demand 
as well as to both productive capacity and to the potential for sustaining growth in  future years. 
Investment in equipment, especially, should expand briskly, being underpinned by improvements in 
demand prospects, competitiveness and profitability, as well as a continuation in terms of  moderate 
wage developments.  Following some  slackening  in  1997,  private  consumption  is  expected to 
accelerate gently in  the years ahead on the  back of moderate  increases  in  real  wages,  a  fall  in 
precautionary savings and, increasingly, by rising employment. 
On balance, the Commission services' Autumn 1997 forecasts expected that in the EU as a whole, 
GOP would expand by 2.6 per cent in 1997, accelerating to about 3 per cent in 1998-99. 
The progressive acceleration in  real GOP growth is expected to have resulted in  net employment 
creation at a rate of 0.5 per cent in  1997 in the EU as a whole, rising to 0.8 % and  1.3  % in  1998 
and 1999 respectively.  This will correspond to a cumulative net creation of 3.8 million jobs over the three years.  This encouraging porfonnance will, however, not completely compensate for the 
job losses of  the early 1990s (4~  million).  In addition, stronger and sustained employment growth 
over the medium term is required to provide employment opportunities for both the high number of 
unemployed and the increased number of people wanting to enter the labour force or to re-enter it 
after a spell of  inactivity. 
Since labour supply is still expected to grow at about 0.5  per cent per year due to in particular a 
further rise in the participation of women and fewer men withdrawing from the labour force, the 
creation of  jobs will not lead to an equal reduction in unemployment.  In the EU  as a whole, the 
unemployment rate is expected to decreue from a peak of  just below 11  per cent in  1996 to  10.7 
per cent in 1997, falling gradually further to 9% per cent in  1999. 
As a result, four years after the adoption of the first Broad Economic Policy Guidelines in  late 
1993, the Union's economic performance shows a mixed record.  On the positive side, all Member 
States  have  managed to reduce  inflation and  budget deficits  significantly,  having  implemented 
stability-oriented macroeconomic policies over the  past years.  Conversely, in terms of economic 
growth and employment, the performance has been disappointing during the first half of  the 1990s. 
This has raised doubts in  some circles about the effectiveness and the soundness of the overall 
policy strategy advocated in the Broad Guidelines. 
That  the  strategy  recommended  is  appropriate  and  works  is  demonstrated  by  the  economic 
performance in countries which have for some time followed sound economic policies, achieved 
wage trends approximately in  line with the Guidelines recommendations, and which have clearly 
reduced their budget deficits to below 3 per cent of  GDP.  In these countries, the results in terms of 
sustainable economic growth and job creation have been favourable and are clearly among the best 
in the Union (the countries are, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark and more recently 
Finland). 
The perception that the strategy has not yet delivered satisfactory results in the Union at large, is in 
part due to the sheer size of  the challenges at the start of the second stage of EMU and in part to 
the,  at  times,  insufficient  progress  in  implementing  the  appropriate  policy  measures.  The 
disappointing performance of the EU during the period 199 I  -96 in terms of GDP growth (I .6 per 
cent p.a.)  and employment (-0.4  per cent p.a.)  is  in  sharp contrast with  the  substantial  results 
achieved in 1986-90 (growth of  3.3 per cent p.a., employment 1.3 per cent p.a. ).  With hindsight, it 
becomes increasingly evident that the poor growth and employment performance in the Union over 
the years  1991-96 was mainly the  result of three macroeconomic obstacles to growth within the 
Union. 
(i)  An initial overheating of the economy (from  1988 onwards), precipitated by an excessively 
expansionary macroeconomic policy-mix, fuelled  inflation (from  1989) which spiralled into 
correspondingly  higher  increases  in  nominal  wages  (from  1990).  The  rekindling  of 
inflationary pressures caused the monetarY authorities to adopt a very tight policy, which had a 
knock-on effect in all the EU countries, but budgetary policy initially remained lax, or even 
clearly expansionary in some countries.  Consequently, rising interest rates and the currency 
. crisis of 1992 led to the stabilising recession of 1992-93, with a substantially negative impact 
on employment.  This  stability conflict between  budgetary policy,  wage developments and 
monetary policy was a major macroeconomic obstacle to growth. 
(ii)  A  timely  moderation  of  wage  increases,  sharp  rises  in  productivity  and  increased 
competitiveness  all  contributed  in  1993-94  to  a  healthy  upswing,  similar to  the  1996-97 
recovery.  Exports and investment led the upswing, which was further supported by a gradual 
improv.ement  in  private consumption and employment.  This upturn was,  however, abruptly 
aborted under the combined impact of  the currency upheaval of  spring 1995 and a marked rise 
in  long-term interest rates.  Factors beyond the control of policy-makers in  the EU (e.g., the 
Mexican  crisis  and  the  related  dollar  weakness)  undoubtedly  played  a  role  in  these developments.  The monetary turmoil was, however, largely rooted in  insufficiently credible 
economic policies in  the Union, especially a lack of credible budget conso!idation plans in 
several  Member States.  Such  currency  upheavals,  which  have  occurred  repeatedly  in  the 
Union, were another major macroeconomic obstacle to growth. 
(iii) The  fact  that  healthy  upswings  have  been  repeatedly  cut  short  by  stability  conflicts  and 
currency upheavals since the first oil price shock and the end of  the Bretton Woods system has 
contributed to a decline in the investment rate in the Union.  As a result, the potential rate of 
economic growth is relatively low (currently at around 2~  per cent per annum}, which in itself 
constitutes a third obstacle to growth. 
If the Union  is  to achieve a sustained period of healthy economic growth capable of ensuring a 
significant  and  lasting  reduction  in  unemployment,  it  has  to  find  lasting  solutions  to  these 
macroeconomic  obstacles  to  growth.  A  more  vigorous  and  credible  implementation  of the 
Guidelines strategy over·the last two years has set in motion a virtuous circle.  The exchange rate 
disturbances,  which  occurred during  1995,  have  been  broadly  reversed  and  a  higher degree  of 
stability has returned within the ERM.  Long-term interest rates have converged towards low levels. 
Sounder economic policies have led to an improvement in economic confidence and have laid the 
ground for the current improvement in economic activity.  Thus, the economic strategy described in 
the  Bryad  Economic  Policy  Guidelines  is  now  delivering  its  expected  results.  The  stability-
oriented policy framework of  EMU is likely to help overcome, in a more permanent manner, these 
obstacles to sustained growth and job creation.  The benefits in terms of economic growth and job 
creation from a good macroeconomic performance will be all the greater the more product, service 
and labour markets work efficiently.  In these areas, although considerable progress has been made 
in recent years, much remains to be done.  It is therefore essential that Member States step up their 
efforts in these fields. 
1.2.  Opportunities and risks 
(i)  After a protracted period of slow growth, the necessary conditions for  sustained growth  in 
output and employment in the EU are now in  place. Taking into account the combination of 
very  favourable  supply-side  conditions,  improved  demand  prospects  and  a  further 
strengthening of confidence, a period of balanced and self-sustaining economic growth could 
indeed ensue. 
u'nderlying economic fundamentals are sound and, if anything, are as good as or even better 
than those  prevailing at the onset of the  1993-94  upswing or even  during the  high  growth 
period  1986-1990.  Inflation is  historically low and contained in  almost all  Member States. 
With  spare  capacity  stiU  available  and  a  recovery  increasingly  supported  by  capacity-
increasing  investment,  growth  can  develop without  generating  inflationary pressures.  The 
profitability of investment is at a level not seen since the late 1960s and is improving further. 
In such a situation, brightening demand prospects and strengthened confidence can generate a 
sound and durable recovery.  At present, there are still some weaknesses in  internal demand. 
But in the present context, demand cannot be stimulated by fiscal expansion or by significantly 
stronger wage increases.  Internal demand has thus to come from  an endogenous process in 
which the initial external impulse should be progressively replaced by the induced expansion 
of investment and  private consumption. This presupposes favourable  monetary conditions, a 
high profitability of investment and a climate of  confidenc~.  These conditions are more and 
more being met.  Interest rates are at an  historical low and  are converging downwards while 
intra-EU  exchange rates  have  been  very  stable and  are  in  line  with  fundamentals.  Finally, 
business and consumer confidence is being buttressed by several factors.  The latter include 
heightened expectations of  a robust recovery, credible and soundly based reductions in budget 
deficits, an  increased political will and determination, both at national and EU level, to tackle 
the Union's stubborn unemployment problem  and  the  growing perception that a large EMU 
will be launched on schedule. 
3 (ii)  Concerning the Asian crisis, despite the grim economic situation in Asia and the challenges 
facing  the  international fmancial  system,  there  are  reasons,  given  developments  so  far,  for 
believing that the Asian crisis will only have a small impact on the present recovery in the EU 
and will have no  influence on the anival of the euro.  The trade exposure of the EU to the 
Asian region is  limited.  Consequently, the lower demand growth in Asia and the improved 
competitiveness of the region following the marked depreciation of its currencies will affect 
EU exports only marginally.  The exposure of  the financial sectors of some Member States to 
the region is  important, but concentrated in relatively sound economies (namely Hong Kong 
and  Singapore).  On the other band,  through lower EU  import prices, the Asian crisis may 
exert a positive influence on  inflation in the EU,  implying that officially-controlled interest 
rates could be held lower than they otherwise would have been.  Finally, there are no signs as 
yet that the Asian fmancial turmoil has affected the spill-over in the EU from external demand 
to domestic  spending, which should become the  main  driving force  of economic growth  in 
1998.  In sum, the fmancial turbulence in Asia will lead to some reduction in economic growth 
in the EU in 1998, but the adverse impact is likely to be rather small.  A recent simulation with 
the  QUEST  model,  which  suggests  that  the  crisis  could  knock  off about  a  quarter  of a 
percentage point of  output growth in the EU in 1998, corroborates this qualitative assessment. 
... 
In part related to- developments  in  Asia, there bas  also been  some  concern about the  stock 
market volatility that affected the world economy at large during the second half of 1997 and 
at the beginning of 1998.  In the industrial countries, the correction that took place during this 
period has,  however,  been  reversed  in  recent weeks.  Nevertheless,  renewed  falls  in  stock 
prices  cannot  be  excluded.  Were  these  to  occur,  the  adverse  impact  on  confidence  and 
economic activity would probably not be very important.  Unlike in the United States, market 
capitalisation  is  low  and  the  role  of shares  in  households'  portfolios  is  rather  limited  in 
continental Europe. Furthennore, any negative effect could be offset by lower interest rates if 
the liquidity withdrawn from stock markets were to be invested in the bond market or through 
policy reactions by the monetary authorities. 
1.3.  Economic policy requirementa 
Although  an  increasingly  robust  cyclical  upturn  has  taken  hold,  this  is  not  the  time  for  any 
relaxation of  policy effort.  The challenges facing policy-makers are twofold: 
•  in the short run. to maintain monetary stability and market confidence; 
•  in the medium-term, to transform the upswing into a strong and sustained growth process. 
Meeting these challenges is crucial to the realisation of two complementary priority objectives of 
the EU, namely: 
•  a smooth transition towards EMU and its successful operation; 
•  a substantial and lasting reduction in the level of unemployment while significantly increasing 
the employment rate. 
Progress towards a return to sound public fmances  is  instrumental to the fulfilment of these two 
objectives. 
With spare capacity available  and  with  prospects for  healthy growth  in  investment in  plant and 
machinery, solid growth should be able to take place without encountering capacity constraints or 
generating inflationary tensions. Monetary conditions may thus remain favourable for an extended 
period.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  interest  rates  have  converged  towards  low  levels  shows  that 
financial markets are confident that the framework for  monetary and budgetary policies in EMU 
will ensure low inflation in the long run. 
It  is  essential to maintain this confidence and to  guarantee a smooth transition to  EMU through 
credible  policy  action.  In  the  monetary  field,  once  the  decision  has  been  made  as  to  which countries will take part in the third stage of EMU from  its outset, there is likely to be a need for 
enhanced monetary co-ordination for two principal reasons.  Fintly, to support market stability in 
the intermediate phase by emphasising the fmn commitment to EMU.and by underlining a common 
view on the future single monetary policy.  Secondly, to ensure that the ECB  inherits a monetary 
environment consistent with price stability in the prospective euro area and thus to help avoid any 
sharp movements in interest rates at the beginning of EMU.  In the budgetary field,  it is essential 
that Member States fully implement their 1998 budgets and/or their convergence programmes.  The 
objectives set out in these budgetary plans should be considered as ceilings, not targets. In those 
countries where growth has been quite robust for some years or where the convergence in interest 
rates in the run-up to EMU would imply a further fall  in rates, there may be a particular need to 
quicken the pace of  budget deficit reduction. 
Ensuring a transfonnation of the present recovery into a non-inflationary, high economic growth 
process over the medium term  - a prerequisite for substantially and durably higher employment -
will  require  a strengthened  programme  of macroeconomic  and  structural  policies  to  address  a 
number  .of  key  challenges  while  allowing  the  EU  economies  to  better  adapt  to  changing 
circumstances in the years ahead.  In conformity with the Resolution on Growth and Employment 
from the Amsterdam European Council, .durably reducing unemployment will require action over a 
broad  front,  with  an  essential  ingredient  being  macroeconomic  policies,  including  wage 
developments, that promote sustainable growth and stability.  It will also be essential that Member 
States continue, and where necessary, intensify structural reforms that should, over time, improve 
the functioning of  product, services and labour markets. 
l.  THE EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGE 
l.l.  Why an employment chaUeaae? 
Article 2 of  the Amsterdam Treaty on the European Union states explicitly:  "The Community shall 
have as its task,  by establishing a common marlcet and an economic and monetary union and by 
implementing  common  policies  or  activities  {. .  .],  to  promote  throughout  the  Community  a 
harmonious,  balanced  and  sustainable  development  of economic  activities,  a  high  level  of 
employment and of social protection,  equality between  men  and women,  sustainable and non-
inflationary growth, a high degree of  competitiveness and convergence of  economic performance, a 
high level of  protection and improvement of  the  quality of  the  environment,  the raising of  the 
standard of  living and quality of  life,  and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among 
Member States. " 
Indeed, a common, comprehensive defmition of competitiveness in the economy as a whole is as 
follows.  A country is internationally competitive if  concurrently: 
- its productivity increases at a rate which  is similar to or higher than that of its major trading 
partners with a comparable level of  development; 
- it maintains external equilibrium in the context of  an open free-market economy; and 
- it realises a high level of  employment. 
If one  looks  at the  overall  perfonnances  of the  European  Union  in  terms  of productivity  and 
external equilibrium, the picture is satisfactory.  During the last 24 years (1974-1997}, the growth 
of labour productivity
1 remained stable at 2 per cent per year on average; i.e. well above the United 
States (0.7 per cent per year during the same period) and, more recently, even slightly above Japan 
(1.9 per cent per year in 1986-97).  Similarly, the current account of  the EU as a whole has always 
fluctuated  within  narrow  limits,  close  to  equilibrium  or in  slight  surplus  thereby  allowing  for 
capital export and development aid.  However, as regards the labour market, the most dominant 
feature of the EU  is the mediocrity of  its employment growth and level with  respect not only to 
1  Defined u  real ODP per employed person. 
5 what the Union was able to sustain during the 1960s but also compared to the United States and 
Japan. 
2.2.  The extent of  non-employment 
According to Eurostat's standardised unemployment definition, the number of unemployed persons 
in  the  Union amounted to approximately  18  million  in  1997,  representing  10.7  per cent of the 
civilian labour force. Furthennore, the weak employment perfonnance of the Union since the mid-
1970s has not only led to a fivefold increase in the unemployment rate but has also resulted in a 
very low ratio of effectively employed persons with respect to the working-age population. This 
ratio,  the  employment  rate,  fell  from  67  per  cent  in  1961  (a  level  reached  even  before  the 
considerable  expansion  of the  female  labour  force)  to  about  60  per cent  presently  whereas  it 
exceeds  74  per  cent  in  the  USA  and  Japan.  Such  a  large  fall  goes  beyond  the  impact  of 
unemployment alone since activity rates tend to fall  when unemployment goes up  ("discouraged 
worker'' effect). 
The future employment rate will depend on economic and social conditions that may strongly differ 
from previous periods.  However, in the medium to long tenn, if sufficient jobs are created, the EU 
employment rate could easily return to a level at least as high as in the early 1960s (67 per cent).  In 
fact, if  the female employment rate remains unchanged at the level reached in  1997 and if  the male 
employment rate returns to its high level of  the 1960s, then the overall employment rate for the EU 
could even be 70  per cent.  Besides, a further (and likely) increase in  female participation would 
bring the EU to 72 per cent or even close to the US and Japanese levels. These two limits (67 and 
72  per cent) imply  an  employment potential of either 22  or 34 million  people,  respectively the 
equivalent of  total employment at present in France and Gennany. 
It should also be noted that, in fact, the employment potential is even higher since the present 60 
per cent employment rate corresponds to 55  per cent in tenns of full-time equivalent posts due to 
the  impact of part-time work of which a part is  involuntary and corresponds thus to a fonn  of 
partial unemployment. 
In the short run, the present degree of non-employment is undoubtedly a weakness and the source 
of a  large social cost but the  labour reserve associated with  it  also  represents a very  important 
growth potential beyond the growth coming from labour productivity increases.  Such a potential is 
not available  in  the  US  and  in  Japan,  and  it constitutes  an  opportunity that  should  be  seized. 
Indeed, the utilisation of this potential would greatly alleviate Member States' public finances and 
social security systems
3
, facilitating the safeguarding and development of  common European social 
values, as well as the reduction of  tax pressure both on companies and on individuals. It would also 
make the transition towards.a more environmentally friendly production mode significantly easier. 
For the latter, examples of  the social and environmental needs that may be fulfilled within the job 
creation process may  be  found  in  recent Commission reports  on  Employment  Pacts  and  Local 
Initiatives.  In the same spirit, an investment-led, durable growth pattern fits very well with the long 
tenn investment strategies proposed by the Commission in  its November 1997 Communication on 
1  Strong economic growth over the medium term combined with a determined implementation of  the 1998 Employment 
Guidelines could result in an increase in the employment rate to 6S per cent within five years in the EU as a whole. 
3  The ratio of people aged 6S  and over to those in the active age groups (the so-called grey pressure) will increase by 
about one  third  between  199S  and  2020.  If the  employment  rate,  i.e.  the  share  of those  financing  pay-as-you-go 
pension schemes, remains as low as it is now and unemployment remains above 1  0 per cent of the labour force, social 
contributions likewise would have to be increased by 33 per cent if one wants to maintain the present ratio of pensions 
to earned income. On the other hand, if  the employment rate could be raised to the present US or Japanese levels (74 
per cent) with a return to (nearly) full  employment, the increase in  contributors would nearly match the  increase in 
pensioners.  Furthermore,  the  increase  in  contribution  rates  required  to  maintain  the  same  relative  pension  levels 
would be negligible.  For more details, sec European Economy, n° 56,  1994, Analytical Study no 5. 
6 Environment  and  Employment,  so  as  to  promote  environmentally  sustainable  production  and 
consumption patterns. 
' 
Finally,  strong  economic  growth  in  the  EU  provides  considerable  help  towards  a  successful 
transition in the candidate countries and in the less-developed world as a whole. 
To exploit the huge labour reserve, two conditions must be met: firstly, the existing workforce must 
be "employable" and notably meet the changing skill requirements of the economy and, secondly, 
the economy must create the necessary working posts. 
2.3.  The employability oflabour 
The effects of  globalisation and the permanent introduction of  new technologies are raising the skill 
requirements for jobs. In this context, in agreement with the recommendation contained in the 1998 
Employment Guidelines approved by the Council  in  December  1997,  training policies (broadly 
defined)  should  provide the environment needed  for  the  improvement  in  human  capital,  which 
remains a major economic and social goal. It must, however, be noted that given the pressure of 
competition (both internal and external) and of  technological and organisational progress, this need 
for qualifications applies to all members of the potential  labour force,  both  in  and out of work. 
Investment in knowledge is a permanent task and will remain so in the medium to long run. 
But it should be kept in mind that in order to produce their full  return, training policies must go 
together with a strong creation of  working posts in the economy so that people going through these 
re-training efforts do indeed find a job at the end of it. If this is not the case, the full  potential of 
these costly efforts cannot be realised and for individuals, it is a strong source of  frustration. 
It should also be appreciated, at the present time, that both the cyclical (about 2 per cent of the 
labour force) and nearly one half of the non-cyclical part of unemployment (i.e. about 4 per centt 
is composed of persons still in  the normal turnover of the  labour market,  in  the sense that they 
could easily return to work, with some (limited) retraining, provided that new working posts are 
created for them.  This means that from  the present  10.7 per cent of the  labour force  which  is 
unemployed, about 6 per cent could re-enter the job market fairly fast if and when jobs are offered 
to them.  Thus, despite some bottlenecks in a few  specific sectors, there is  no  evidence that the 
skills offered by a sizeable share of the workforce are basically outdated or insufficient to ensure 
employability.  The true  immediate  bottleneck is  located at the  level  of net job creation  in  the 
economy. 
Finally, in a longer term perspective, even part of  the structural unemployment stricto sensu (about 
S per cent of the  labour force) could be re-integrated  into  employment by  active  labour market 
policies and other structural measures (see section 4.5, below) if the economy creates the required 
working posts. 
2.4.  Growth, productivity and employment 
To achieve a high employment rate in the EU, which is a requirement of the Treaty (Article 2), it 
will be crucial to generate, over an extended period of time, economic growth well above the rate 
coming from  increases in  labour productivity  in  the overall economy,  whatever the  pace of the 
latter might be. Over the last two decades, overall labour productivity has increased at a stable rate 
of  2 per cent per year on average in the Union'.  This has resulted, in more or less equal proportion, 
4  See, European &onomy, n° S9,  199S, Analytical Study n °3. 
5  With the productivity trend stable at 2 per cent per year, a trend growth of  real GDP of 2 per cent per year will simply 
keep employment constant. Furthermore, since labour supply is still likely to  grow  by about 0.4 to  O.S  per cent per 
year in the medium term, a real GOP growth rate of  higher than 2.S per cent is needed to reduce unemployment. 
7 from the incorporation of  technological and organisational progress (total factor productivity) and a 
substitution of  labour by capital at the macroeconomic Ievel
6
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Since technological progress is the main source of wealth and improvement in the quality of living 
standards over the long run, policies should be directed at maintaining, and even accelerating, the 
pace  of technological  change.  This  is  also  necessary  in  order  to  safeguard  the  Union's 
competitiveness  in  an  ever closely  integrated  world  economy.  Furthermore,  there  are  powerful 
forces at work, such as globalisation, the completion of  the internal market and the move towards a 
knowledge-based economy, which are expected to sustain the trend of  total factor productivity but 
also of  labour to capital substitution in the Union in the future. 
On the other hand, with respect to substitution of capital for labour at the macroeconomic level, the 
Union's  economy  has  traditionally  been  characterised  by  a  comparatively  strong  degree  of 
substitution, implying a stronger increase in the capital intensity of its production process than for 
instance  in  the  United  States.  However,  the  analysis  of the  1986-90  data  shows  that  the 
combination  of wage  moderation  (hence,  profitability  increases)  combined  with  good  demand 
prospects and strong growth in capacity-expanding investment may reduce significantly the rate of 
labour to capital substitution. Thus, if the evolution of wages continues to be appropriate, a further 
slowing-down of this substitution process is  to be  expected.  Simultaneously, through  increased 
profitability,  it reinforces the foundations  for  higher,  investment-supported, economic growth as 
demand prospects brighten.  By incorporating new technologies, the new investment will contribute 
to sustaining total factor productivity growth and, to the extent it is capacity widening, slow down 
the substitu~ion process
7
•  For another way to weaken the substitution process, see section 4.5. 
3.  EMU AND MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICIES CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT 
3.1.  The established consensus  of the Broad Guidelines  and the favourable,  new, 
policy framework in EMU 
Within the framework of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines a solid EU-wide consensus has 
been established on a common macroeconomic policy strategy to  achieve sustained,  investment-
supported,  output growth  and job creation over the  medium  term  without  inflationary tensions. 
This strategy contains three essential ingredients, which may be summarised as follows: 
a stability-oriented monetary policy; 
sustained efforts to consolidate the public finances in most Member States consistent with the 
objectives of  the Stability and Growth Pact; 
nominal wage trends consistent with the price stability objective~ at the same time, real wage 
developments with respect to increases  in  productivity should take into account the  need  to 
strengthen the profitability of  investment and to support the purchasing power of  workers. 
6  For a detailed analysis, sec "1997 Annual Economic Report", European &anomy, no 63, 1997. 
7  The experience of  Ireland seems to bear this out in an even clearer way.  In Ireland, macroeconomic wage moderation 
since the mid-1980s was much stronger than in the Union on average (e.g.  over the period  1991-97. in  Ireland real 
wages grew by l.S percentage points less than the labour productivity trend of 4 per cent p.a.  whereas in the EU they 
rose  by  1.1  percentage point less than the labour productivity trend of 2  per cent  p.a.).  This  has resulted  in  a 
significant slowing down of capital-labour substitution, but the growth of labour productivity has been maintained, 
helped by higher capacity-widenina investment which incorporated technical progress.  Simultaneously,  in  Ireland, 
economic activity and employment grew at a strong pace (average annual rate of growth of 6\1,  per cent and 2\1,  per 
cent,  respectively).  On the  other hand,  in  the  Netherlands  wage  moderation  in  combination with  labour market 
refonns (especially part-time work)  since  1983  has  led  to  a  slowdown  in  capital-labour  substitution  but  also  in 
apparent labour productivity growth. 
8 The underlying reasoning is that ''the more the stability task of monetary policy is  facilitated  by 
appropriate budgetary measures and wage developments, the more monetary conditions, including 
exchange rates and long-term interest rates, will be favourable to growth and employment" 
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The framework for macroeconomic policies in EMU, as laid down in the Treaty and supplemented 
by the Stability and Growth Pact and the new exchange rate mechanism (ERM2), reflects, builds on 
and will reinforce this consensus.  Consequently, the realisation of  EMU enhances the prospects of 
avoiding  the  three  principal  reasons  or  obstacles  that  have~  on  repeated  occasions,  brought 
economic growth and job creation in the Union to a premature halt (see above, section 1.1 ).  This 
holds because in EMU: 
+ exchange rate turbulence will be ruled out among participating countries and the euro exchange 
rate with non-participating Member States is likely to be stable, especially if they participate in 
the ERM2, as countries with a derogation are expected to do. The more countries take part in 
the single currency, the greater the benefits of the Single Market will be.  Moreover, given the 
economic importance of the prospective euro-zone in the world economy, the euro could help 
stabilise world currency relationships.  This possibility is further enhanced by the commitment 
of policy-makers  on  both  sides  of the  Atlantic  to  pursue  stability-oriented  macroeconomic 
policies.  Thus, extra-EC trade (representing only about 10 per cent of  Community GOP) would 
probably also be favoured; 
+ stability conflicts will be more easily avoided.  The Treaty provisions (Art.  I 04 to  I 04c  )
9 and 
the Stability and Growth Pact with its goal of an underlying budgetary position close to balance 
or in  surplus in  "normal" cyclical conditions decisively reduce the risk of conflicts between 
budgetary and monetary policies.  This also makes it possible to durably achieve a low level of 
long-term  interest rates.  Moreover,  given that exchange  rate  changes  between  participating 
countries are ruled out and given the price stability task of the ECB, the responsibilities of the 
two sides of  industry in setting wages are increased.  These two factors will also make it easier 
for  them  to  settle  wage  agreements  in  conformity  with  stability  and  growth.  Finally,  the 
conditions and incentives for wage and price discipline will be enhanced in EMU by increased 
product market integration and competition; 
+ a  more  stable  and less  risk-prone  environment for  investment  will  be  created  The  single 
currency will create a zone of  macroeconomic stability and low inflation and will thus provide a 
stable framework  in  which companies can plan and  invest.  The  investment process will thus 
benefit  from  the  stability  context  in  the  sense  that  its  expansion  will  not  be  abruptly  and 
prematurely interrupted by stability conflicts or monetary turbulence. Besides, reduced volatility 
in exchange rates, inflation, interest rates and economic activity will reduce the required rate of 
return on investment decisions.  The euro will be a complement to the Single Market, boosting 
competition and providing new opportunities to invest.  For these reasons, the stability provided 
by  the  EMU  regime  will  make  a  decisive  contribution  to  overcoming the  third  obstacle  to 
growth,  namely  the  insufficient  growth  of productive  capacity  with  respect  to  the  labour 
productivity trend. 
In sum, EMU will help to lock in the fundamental change in the macroeconomic policy mix which 
has been progressively achieved in the Union and which has started to deliver its expected results. 
As  emphasised  in  the  Luxembourg  European  Council  Resolution  on  "Economic  policy  co-
ordination  in stage  3  of EMU'\  the  policy  mix  under  EMU  will  require  closer  Community 
surveillance and co-ordination of economic policies, both among Member States and between the 
I  See "1997 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines", European Economy, n° 64,  1997. 
9  Art.  104:  ban on the monetary financing of government deficits; Art.  1  04a:  ban  on  privileged access for  the public 
authorities to the financial  markets;  Art.  1  04b:  the Community and the public authorities of the Member States are 
prohibited from assuming liability for the debts of other public authorities;  Art.  I  04c:  excessive government deficits 
and debts must be avoided. 
9 parties  involved  in  economic  decision-making.  This  notably  implies  the  close  monitoring  of 
macroeconomic developments in Member States and of the euro exchange rate, the surveillance of 
budgetary  positions  and  policies,  the  monitoring  of structural  policies  in  labour,  product  and 
services markets and of cost and price trends, the fostering of tax reform to raise efficiency and 
discourage harmful tax competition. 
The enhanced co-ordination will adhere to the principle of subsidiarity, respecting the prerogatives 
of national governments in determining structural and budgetary policies subject to the provisions 
of  the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact.  It will respect too the independence of the ESCB 
and the role of  the ECOFIN Council as the central decision-making body and will respect national 
traditions and the competence of  the social partners in the wage formation process. 
Finally, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines should be developed into an effective instrument 
for  ensuring  sustained  convergence  and  should  provide  more  concrete  and  country-specific 
guidelines  and  focus  more  on  measures  to  improve  Member  States'  growth  potential,  thus 
increasing employment. 
3.1.  Monetary policy 
Monetary policy in the euro-area wiii be under the responsibility of the ECB and the ESCB.  In 
conformity with Article 1  OS( 1  ), the primary objective of monetary policy wiii be to maintain price 
stability  and,  subject  thereto,  to  support  the  economic  objectives  of the  Union,  including  in 
particular sustained,  non-inflationary,  growth  and a  high  level  of employment,  as  laid  down  in 
Article 2 of  the Treaty. 
The credibility of  the ECB in delivering price stability is of paramount importance in achieving low 
long-term interest rates and positively influencing the behaviour of price and  wage setters. This 
credibility is an important asset in realising higher levels of investment, growth and employment. 
The credibility of  the ECB in delivering price stability is underpinned not only by the clarity of its 
objective but also by the Treaty guaranteed independence of  the ECB and of its governing council. 
The credibility of the ECB and the euro will therefore from  the outset be as high as that of any 
existing central bank and major world currency.  This has been clearly confirmed by developments 
in the financial markets in the run-up to EMU.  In the countries that have shown a determination to 
·meet the convergence criteria and participate in EMU, long-term interest rates have fallen towards 
the best performers in the ERM.  Moreover; long-term interest rates have even fallen to record low 
levels in Germany, the country that is traditionally viewed as having had the most credible central 
bank and most stable money.  Record-low nominal interest rates in  Germany and other countries 
are  an  unmistakable  sign  that  the  credibility  of the  euro  and  the  ECB  is,  from  the  outset, 
comparable with that of  the best performing Member States. 
Finally, and not least importantly, the more the stability task of monetary policy is facilitated by a 
sound  budge~ policy,  inspired  by the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  and  by  appropriate  wage 
developments, in  line with stability and growth, the less monetary policy is overburdened and the 
more  monetary  conditions,  including  the  euro  exchange  rate  and  long-term  interest  rates,  can 
develop in a way that is  favourable to growth and employment. This will represent clear progress 
over the earlier, "pre-EMU", times. 
For the European Central Bank this implies, in  line with Art.  lOS  (l} of the Treaty, that it pursues 
its primary objective of  maintaining price stability with emphasis and credibility, but it implies also 
that,  "without prejudice to the objective of price  stability",  it  support(s) the  general  economic 
policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the ·achievement of the objectives of the 
Community as laid down in Art. 2", including the objectives of growth and employment. 
10 3.3.  Budgetary policy 
Budgetary policies  will  remain  the  responsibility of national  governments  in  EMU  but will  be 
subject to the constraints of the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, which emphasises the 
need to balance the budget in "normal" economic conditions and clarifies the key Treaty provisions 
on  budgetary policy. These legal provisions reflect the recognition that sound budgetary policies 
are an essential condition for sustained, non-inflationary growth and a high  level of employment. 
This is so because sound budgetary policies, apart from facilitating the.task of monetary policy in 
maintaining price stability, will: 
+ by  helping to  reduce  long-term  interest rates,  generate  a crowding-in of  private investment. 
Since in such circumstances governments no longer absorb private saving, but make a positive 
contribution to savings in  the economy, the increase in  the investment rate can  - other things 
being equal - take place without pressures on the balance of payments and  long-term  interest 
rates; 
+ create the necessary room to cope with adverse cyclical developments.  This will be particularly 
important after the introduction of a single currency, because the adjustment to country-specific 
shocks will then, to a higher degree, rest with budgetary policy; 
•  by curbing public debt ratios and hence reducing the debt service burden, facilitate the needed 
restructuring of  government spending towards more productive uses and lowering of  taxes and 
social security contributions,  while making the taxation system more employment friendly.  It 
will also help prepare for the budgetary consequences of  population ageing. 
Budgetary issues will also form  an integral part of the strengthened multilateral surveillance and 
co-ordination of economic policies agreed at the Luxembourg European Council.  Such policy co-
ordination will facilitate the maintenance of appropriate budgetary policies  in  each participating 
Member State and in  the euro-zone as a  whole, taking into account the current and prospective 
stance of  monetary policies, the economic situation and prospects, etc. 
Critics have argued that this commitment to disciplined budgetary policies will result in an unduly 
restrictive  budgetary  stance,  hence  risking  exacerbating  fluctuations  in  economic  activity. 
However, this does not take into account that, given the "virtuous circle" effects of  the considerable 
efforts already made, of  the fall in interest rates and the general reduction in the public debt burden, 
it will be much easier to bring budget deficits from 3 per cent of GOP to zero, if the medium term 
growth path develops as expected, than it was to bring them to 3 per cent of  GOP in the first place. 
Critics also ignore the fact that the possibility to use the stabilising function of fiscal policies has 
been  increasingly lost over the  last three decades.  In  this period,  Member States with relatively 
high deficits and debt levels have often found themselves compelled to follow restrictive budgetary 
policies  during  periods  of economic  slowdown.  Budgetary  consolidation  will  help  regain  that 
margin. 
Budgetary positions  close to  balance or in  surplus  in  normal  cyclical  positions  allow  sufficient 
scope to deal with all but the most severe disturbances without breaching the 3 per cent reference 
value. In exceptional circumstances (as specified in the Stability and Growth Pact), Member States 
will  be allowed to surpass this value.  Some Member States will,  however, actually have to plan 
budget surpluses in favourable economic conditions to comply with the Pact's objective of  ensuring 
a sustainable public finance position over the full  range of the economic cycle.  Sound budgetary 
policies will  in  all  likelihood also increase the effectiveness of the automatic stabilisers.  Proven 
budgetary discipline will strengthen the confidence of  economic agents that a rising deficit during a 
recession will not permanently disrupt the public finances, thereby alleviating the adverse effects 
through higher interest rates. 
11 Over the last year, Member States have submitted new or updated convergence programmes setting 
out their medium-tenn budgetary objectives.  They all aim for a continuing budgetary improvement 
in  the years to come, thus making steady progress towards the objective of budgetary positions 
close to balance or in surplus.  The improvement in the public fmances  is helped by the expected 
upswing  in  growth and  employment.  In  many  countries,  the  full  effect of recent years'  sharp 
reduction in interest rates also still has to come through.  In most cases, these cyclical and interest 
rate induced gains are accompanied by further, if moderate, improvements in the structural budget 
positions net of  interest payments. 
Given the important efforts made  in  recent years, showing already positive results, it is essential 
that  Member  States  stick  to  the  budgetary  objectives  set  out  in  their  recent  convergence 
programmes.  The opportunities offered by the improving economic cycle must be seized in order 
to improve  the  state of the  public finances  and to fulfil  the objective of close to  balance or in 
surplus at the earliest possible date.  It is  equally important that policy mistakes are avoided in 
other areas, notably policies which might add to labour cost and inflation pressures and thus could 
precipitate  a  rise  in  interest  rates  or  a  premature  halt  in  business  expansion  and  investment 
dynamism. 
In  order to be consistent with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, budget deficit reductions 
should  be  achieved  mainly  through  continued  expenditure  restraint  rather  than  through  tax 
increases. Until now, for the EU as a whole, the impressive budgetary consolidation effort (from a 
deficit of 6.1  per cent of GOP in  1993  to  2.6 per cent in  1997) was  indeed entirely made  by  a 
contraction in the level of  total expenditures in GOP (from 52.4 per cent in  1993 to 48.7 per cent in 
1997) since the overall tax pressure remained practically constant (at 46.3 per cent of GOP in 1993 
and 46 per cent in 1997). 
However, having reduced their budget deficits to 3 per cent of  GOP or below, some Member States 
(especially the Netherlands, but recently also Gennany) have embarked, or are contemplating doing 
so, on a strategy of simultaneously curbing the budget deficit and the burden of taxation.  Such a 
programme  is  motivated  by  the  need  both  to  control  government  expenditure  growth  and  to 
promote  economic  dynamism,  thereby  strengthening  the  conditions  for  sustained  growth  and 
employment creation.  In view of  the important distortions and disincentives emanating from a high 
level  of taxation,  such  a  strategy  is  certainly  appropriate  provided  that  it  does  not jeopardise 
further, steady, progress towards sound budgetary positions. 
The successive Broad Guidelines exercises have identified two general principles for focusing the 
expenditure structure: (i) priority of controlling public consumption, public pensions provisions, 
health care, passive labour market measures and  subsidies;  (ii) priority  in  favouring  productive 
activities such as investment in infrastructure, human capital, and active labour market initiatives. 
To  the  extent that  such  a  restructuring would  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  number  of people  of 
working  age  receiving  social  transfers  and/or to  an  increase  in  employment,  it  would  help  to 
improve  budgetary  positions over the  medium term.  However,  ex post facto,  it  appears that a 
number  of Member  States  had  difficulties  in  applying  these  principles.  For  instance,  the  EU 
average share of public capital formation in GOP fell from  2.9 per cent in  1992 to 2.2 per cent at 
present and the shift from passive to active labour market policies seems to be somewhat slow. It 
may therefore be  asked whether,  in  the future,  such expenditures should not be  better preserved 
from the general consolidation process. 
As  regards the structure of taxation, the Broad Guidelines and the  1998  Employment Guidelines 
recommended,  for  most Member States, a reduction  in  the  social  contribution burden or in  tax 
wedges as a whole,  in order to reverse the trend towards an  increase in  the tax burden borne by 
employed labour (which rose from 35 per cent in  1980 to more than 42 per cent at present).  It is 
essential that the timing and modalities of efforts to reduce the tax burden on labour are decided 
upon with a view to maximising their employment effects while fostering sound public finances.  In 
12 a broader perspective, apart from an overall reduction in the general level of taxation, as called for 
by the Amsterdam European Council and the 1997 Broad Guidelines, the Commission regards it as 
essential to achieve  greater fiscal  coherence throughout the  Union.  To this  end,  following  the 
adoption of  a code of  conduct in December 1997 and in conformity with the Luxembourg European 
Council Resolution on Policy Co-ordination,  which asks  explicitly for "...  tax  reform  to  raise 
efficiency and the discouragement of harmful tax competition", the Commission will endeavour to 
reach agreement in other important areas, such as the taxation of  capital income and a Community 
framework for the taxation of  energy products. These points will be further covered in sections 4.4 
and 4.5. 
3.4.  Wage developments 
In EMU, wage setting will remain the responsibility of  the social partners at the national, regional, 
sectoral or even at a more decentralised level following their respective traditions. As underlined in 
the Amsterdam Resolution on "Growth and employment", the social partners are responsible to 
reconcile high employment with appropriate wage settlements and to set up a suitable institutional 
framework for the wage formation process. The social dialogue is important for achieving the right 
results.  For that reason, the Broad Guidelines urged the Commission to continue to develop the 
European  social  dialogue,  especially  on  macroeconomic  issues,  on  the  basis  of the  Broad 
Guidelines.  National  governments  retain  a  considerable  responsibility  for  wage  setting,  both 
because of  their role as a large employer and because they set the macroeconomic framework and 
determine the labour market rules and regulations in which the social partners operate. 
The requirements for employment-friendly wage trends in EMU are no different from those already 
specified in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines: (i) nominal wage increases must be consistent 
with price stability; (ii) real wage increases with respect to productivity should take into account 
the need to strengthen the profitability of investme11t and to support the purchasing power of wage 
earners;  and (iii) collective agreements  should better reflect,  in  a  pragmatic  way,  productivity 
differentials according to qualifications and skills,  regions and,  to some extent,  sectors.  These 
recommendations concern wage developments in countries which will participate in EMU but also 
in the other Member States as they should be equally committed to stability-oriented policies
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The credibility of  the EMU macroeconomic framework and the increased competition in the single 
currency zone  is  likely to strengthen wage  and cost discipline.  The conditions  for  maintaining 
appropriate wage trends will be improved because EMU will provide low inflation, secured by the 
ECB, as well as lower inflation variability because sudden shifts in exchange rates are ruled out 
among participating countries.  The known  and credible price stability objective will  facilitate 
agreement on moderate and appropriate wage  increases.  In countries where the social partners 
agree on moderate wage increases in  order to help strengthen employment, they no  longer risk 
seeing the job benefits of their moderation undermined by currency appreciation relative to EMU 
partners.  The  incentives  for  wage  discipline  will  be  improved  too  because  irresponsible  and 
inappropriate wage increases can no longer be accommodated by national monetary and exchange 
rate policies. 
If there were to be national or regional wage agreements not in line with these general rules, this 
would not necessarily imply an acceleration of inflation in the entire monetary union. Even in the 
country or region concerned, the  impaired competitiveness would  probably  lead  less to higher 
inflation but more to higher imports from other regions, since in the monetary union and with the 
internal market the elasticity of supply will be high.  As the reduced competitiveness would risk 
resulting in lower employment in the country or region, it is probable that the social partners would 
avoid such an outcome. 
10  See  also,  "Wage  policy  and  employment  in  Economic  and  Monetary  Union",  Opinion  of the  Economic  Policy 
Committee to the Ecofin Council, October 1997. 
13 On the other hand,  national  or regional  differences  in  wage  developments  will continue to be 
possible  and  necessary  in  EMU,  especially  if a  healthy  catching-up  pr.ocess  is  developing. 
Catching-up countries tend to have a higher trend in productivity growth in the exposed sector and 
therefore  have  room  for  higher  real  wage  increases  while  maintaining  competitiveness  and 
profitability.  Developments in Ireland since the mid-1980s clearly illustrate this point.  Continued 
moderation of  nominal wage increases has led to higher investment and higher productivity growth 
which in tum permitted a rise in real wages that lay clearly above the EU average, without affecting 
inflation and competitiveness and allowing for strong growth and employment (see also footnote 7, 
page 8). 
While the responsibility of  the social partners for employment trends will be enhanced in general, 
two special cases merit attention.  Firstly, the increased transparency of wage and costs levels 
between Member States due to the existence of a single currency and the elimination of exchange 
rate fluctuations, may lead to a certain increase in labour mobility but may also give rise to wage 
claims in lower-wage countries to close the gap with higher wage countries.  As noted above, an 
increase in wages faster than warranted by productivity levels in a country or region would lead to 
a  deterioration  in  competitiveness  and  investment  profitability  and  therefore  to  reduced 
attractiveness as a production location.  The country or region's export performance would suffer, 
investment would be ·deterred and unemployment would increase.  Through a  process of labour 
shedding and capital-labour substitution, labour productivity could gradually increase to match the 
higher  level  of wages.  But  such  a  process  would  entail  further job destruction  and  higher 
unemployment.  For these reasons, ''wage imitation" must be avoided
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Secondly, as a consequence of  the transfer of national monetary and exchange rate policies to the 
Union level, the role of other adjustment instruments will be  enhanced in  the event of possible 
country-specific disturbances.  It will  be particularly  important to  assure that wage adjustment 
plays a positive role in re-establishing output growth and employment following asymmetric shocks 
(see also section 4.2). 
4.  EMU AND STRUCI'URAL POLICIES FOR GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT 
4.1.  Concepts, sub1idiarity and Community coherence 
The Maastricht convergence process has championed greater clarity and a remarkable consensus on 
the role of macroeconomic policies in bringing about higher growth and employment.  A similar 
degree of  understanding has not yet emerged with respect to structural policies. However, at the EU 
level,  considerable  progress  towards  a  more  rational  debate  is  taking  place,  fostered  by  the 
procedures established by the Internal Market programme, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
and the Employment Title of  the Amsterdam Treaty. 
There can be  no  doubt that structural policies have a key role to play in  stimulating economic 
growth, restoring competitiveness and raising employment levels. In economic terms, their key role 
is  to  help  ensure  a  tension-free  macroeconomic  growth  process,  to  reinforce  the  EU's 
competitiveness (and therefore  increasing the potential  growth of productivity), to  increase the 
employment-content of  growth and to make growth more respectful of  the environment.  However, 
to reach their full effectiveness, they must be coherent with the pursuit of sound macroeconomic 
policies.  In this respect, it is essential that the budgetary costs of structural reform are kept under 
control  and  do not jeopardise the  achievement of sound  budgetary  positions.  Their economic 
benefits also emerge only gradually over time and they are clearly more efficient in a context of 
higher economic growth. 
11  The  analysis of present  labour cost differences  between  regions  in  Europe suggests  that these  differences  largely 
reflect the existing discrepancies in labour productivity. 
14 Most structural policies are the responsibility of  national governments and of  the social partners.  It 
is  obvious that in  these  fields  the  principle of subsidiarity must  be  respected.  It  is,  however, 
equally clear that in  implementing structural policies,  Member States  must take  into  account a 
certain  number of principles  and the  necessity  of coherence  at the  level  of the  Union.  These 
principles include inter alia (i) respect of the Treaty principle of an  open market economy, with 
free  competition; (ii) the need not to impede the proper functioning of the  internal market;  (iii) 
consistency with the macroeconomic strategy; (iv) respect of  certain social values and the equality 
of opportunity and,  fmally,  (v)  respect for the  environment.  In  full  respect of the  principle of 
subsidiarity,  a combination of Community  surveillance, joint actions  and  exchange of national 
practices offers the potential of strengthening the competitiveness, growth and job performance of 
the Member States and the Union. 
Finally,  the  Resolution  on  "Growth  and  employment"  adopted  by  the  Amsterdam  European 
Council  asked  that the  Broad  Economic  Policy  Guidelines  put  more  emphasis  on  growth  and 
employment through the co-ordination of macroeconomic and structural policies. The Resolution 
also  contains a request for the  Community  itself to complete  national  measures  by  all  relevant 
Community policies having an  impact on growth and employment, like e.g. the TEN's and R&D 
policies and  by  an  increased  responsibility  of the  European  Investment  Bank  in  financing  the 
development of high-tech projects in SMEs, in studying interventions in education, urban renewal 
and environmental protection and  in  increasing its  interventions in  the field  of the high-priority 
TEN projects adopted  in  Essen.  The Commission  has  also proposed the creation of a Research 
Fund in the field of  Coal and Steel following the expiration of  the CECA Treaty. 
4.1.  Enhanced need for structural adjustment in EMU 
In  the  EU,  the  implementation of structural  reform  has  so  far  been  uneven,  with  considerable 
progress  in  some fields,  particularly product markets,  and  rather  less  in  other areas,  especially 
labour  markets.  Justified  efforts  aimed  at  further  correcting  structural  deficiencies,  which  are 
deeply rooted  in the European economies,  are  made  all  the more  pressing by the  imminence of 
EMU.  The  introduction of a single currency reduces the  instruments  available  to  the  national 
authorities to tackle disturbances that affect their economy differently.  It will no longer be possible 
to absorb or dampen them through nominal exchange rate adjustments. 
Some  observers  have  expressed  doubt  whether  EMU  Member  States  will  be  sufficiently  well 
equipped to cope with economic shocks, especially asymmetric shocks that have differential effects 
across countries.  The first point to recall is that the exchange rate instrument is only suitable to 
deal with shocks that are country-specific, real and temporary.  Already today,  such shocks are 
exceptional.  Furthermore,  in  EMU,  there  are  grounds  for  believing  that  the  incidence  of 
asymmetric shocks will be  limited for various reasons.  In the past, the asymmetric character of 
shocks was considerably amplified by diverging monetary, exchange rate and budgetary policies. 
In  EMU,  with a common monetary policy and exchange rate and with consensus and limits on 
budgetary policies, such developments will become much more rare and much smaller, leading to 
better prospects for more cyclical convergence.  Finally, while most Member States already have 
highly diversified industrial structures  -- more diversified than in the United States -- increased 
product  market  integration  may  possibly,  in  line  with  the  historical  experience  of the  Union, 
stimulate intra-industry trade between Member States and  further enhance the diversification of 
industrial structures. 
When asymmetric shocks do occur, the correct policy response would depend on the nature of the 
shock.  In the  case of a temporary domestic  demand  disturbance,  the  automatic  stabilisers and 
possibly other budgetary measures to cushion the negative demand  impact will  be  desirable and 
sufficient.  As already noted, when it will reach its cruising speed, the Stability and Growth Pact 
allows sufficient room for this to  ~cur. The automatic budgetary stabilisers in  fact will provide 
more stabilisation in EMU Member States than is the case for instance in individual US states even 
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to budgetary stabilisers, some shocks, notably those that affect the competitiveness or the external 
balance of the economy, may require adjustment of relative prices which in EMU can only come 
about through changes in  the rate of wage growth, profit margins or productivity growth.  This 
underscores the need for EU Member States to further reform product, services and labour markets 
to enhance flexibility and efficiency. 
Failure to make resolute headway in  bringing about a  greater flexibility of the Member States' 
economies will have serious consequences; economic growth will  not  be  sufficiently bolstered, 
employment levels will  not be  significantly raised  and  progress  towards  greater economic and 
social cohesion among the Member States will be jeopardised.  On the other hand, EMU itself is 
likely to act as a catalyst for structural reform.  The single currency will unleash competitive forces 
that  will  strengthen  the  incentives  for  structural  reforms,  thereby  improving  the  chances  for 
reducing unemployment.  Policy makers have recognised the importance of  flexible markets to help 
in adjusting to shocks and to make their economies more efficient.  With the adoption of  an Action 
Plan for the Single Market and the 1998 Employment Guidelines, the Council took decisive actions 
last year.  It is essential to carry these plans through and to complement them, especially at the 
national level, with measures in other fields. 
4.3.  Sectoral changes in the growth process and structural policies 
Technical progress and globalisation lead to permanent structural changes in the growth process. 
They  put  constant  pressure  on  the  economy  to  maintain  and  improve  competitiveness  and 
productivity and unleash a dynamic process of  job creation and job destruction.  In sectors with 
high increases in productivity, fierce international and intra-EU competition leads to falling relative 
prices which in tum allow productivity gains, for a large part, to be passed on to the rest of the 
economy through the price mechanism.  This market-induced transfer of purchasing power allows 
for  rising  relative  prices  in  sectors  with  low  productivity gains  and  less  competitive  pressure, 
thereby permitting the creation of  profitable jobs in these sectors. 
This is an age-old process, for which there is clear statistical evidence, and which requires that the 
price  mechanism  operates  effectively.  To a  large  extent  the  opening-up  of markets  and  the 
liberalisation and deregulation of  previously closed sectors have met this condition.  Nevertheless, 
in order for this process to create sufficient jobs there are two further prerequisites:  (i) sectoral 
change must be accepted, including more labour mobility, and be assisted by strengthened efforts to 
improve human capital formation, in particular with respect to low-skilled labour, and has to occur 
in a socially acceptable manner; (ii) the growth rate in  the economy at large must be  sufficiently 
high for the balance between sectoral job creation and sectoral job losses to be positive and large 
enough to bring about a fall in unemployment. 
These two conditions are interrelated.  The stronger the overall economic growth, the easier the 
process of  sectoral change will be, and the more readily its social effects can be cushioned.  Only if 
efforts  to  increase  competitiveness  and  productivity  are  accompanied  by  correspondingly  high 
growth and rising employment levels can the potential prosperity gains from  technical progress, 
globalisation and the internal market be fully exploited.  On the structural side, it will be necessary 
to  ensure  that  product  and  services  markets  function  efficiently  and  that  the  labour  force  is 
employable and adaptable, thereby underscoring the need for a determined .implementation of the. 
specific recommendations contained in the 1998 Employment Guidelines. 
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The functioning of  product and services markets covers many aspects. 
The process of sectoral change and the interplay of relative prices described in section 4.3  require 
that the price mechanism works fully in the EU.  Price flexibility will be of  even greater importance 
after  the  introduction  of a  single  currency.  Competition  policy  will  thus  remain  of critical 
importance under EMU in order to ensure that neither private, nor public behaviour undermines 
effective competition in more globalised and integrated markets. 
All  too  often,  the  product  and  services  markets  in  the  EU  are  still  submitted  to  outdated  or 
corporatist regulations that hamper their full  development.  The suppression or modernisation of 
these regulations when made in a socially acceptable way is likely to favour entrepreneurship and 
to allow a faster growth without tensions in the relevant sectors.  These deregulation efforts are all 
the  more  needed  to  promote  the  start  up  of firms  and  to  encourage  the  development  of self-
employment.  In that way, environmentally sustainable production and consumption patterns and 
further development of  ceo-industries could also be promoted. 
Improved  functioning  of markets  for  goods  and  services  will  also  require  timely  and  full 
completion of the internal market programme,  in conformity with the Commission's Action Plan. 
The  Single  Market  represents  the  cornerstone  of Economic  Union.  By  favouring  an  efficient 
allocation of resources and reinforcing competition, it will contribute to the good functioning of 
markets, which is essential to the sustainability of  Monetary Union. 
In the EU,  significant barriers to market access still exist in sectors accounting for approximately 
half of  the GOP of  the EU.  In the field of goods, the main barriers are to be found in the fields of 
public procurement and construction (which alone accounts for  10% of GOP).  For services· such 
restrictions are frequent in services sold to other enterprises (producer services) as well as in those 
sold to the final  consumer (consumer services).  They  include on the  one  hand  key  services for 
industry  such  as  energy,  telecommunications  and  transport,  financial  services  and  business, 
particularly  professional,  services  and  on  the  other  hand  such  services  as  commerce  and 
distribution, household and welfare services. 
Amongst the  services with the tightest restrictions are  to  be  found  most of the  sectors with the 
highest job creation potential. In their search for the most efficient forms to organise production, 
companies have extemalised services that have formerly been provided within the company itself. 
This  process  has  been  driving  the  growth  of producer  services,  as  has  the  growing  intangible 
content of  products. 
Several  infrastructure  services  have  in  the  past  been  delivered  predominantly  by  monopoly 
suppliers.  Here,  liberalisation  of markets  may  initially  lead  to  significant job  losses  amongst 
established suppliers as they quickly exploit the latent potential for productivity gains attainable in 
these  industries.  However,  the  consequences  of liberalisation  are  the  growth  of new  market 
entrants,  the  development  of new  products  using  infrastructure  services  and  the  increased 
investment in infrastructure capital goods. This means that job creation has proved positive overall 
in  those  countries  where  liberalisation  has  been  achieved.  The  leading  example  is 
telecommunications.  A competitive market  in  this  field  is  also  a necessary requirement for  the 
development  of the  information  society  and  the  introduction  and  expansion  of electronic 
commerce. 
The job creation potential of services supplied to consumers  is  particularly significant,  because 
most of them occur in a geographically limited area and  are little traded. Therefore, they are not 
exposed  to  pressure  from  third  countries  with  low  wages,  despite  being  labour-intensive.  In 
addition, the changing structure of demand in developed countries means that these services have 
17 one of  the highest output growth rates.  A comparison with other developed countries demonstrates 
that particularly the job creating component of service growth has  been significantly less than in 
North America and Japan. 
In the framework of the Commission's Action Plan, and in line with the Resolution on economic 
policy  co-ordination  attached  to  the  Luxembourg  European  Council  c~nclusions,  all  factors 
affecting the efficiency of Member States' economies as well as the structural impediments which 
diminish their growth and job-creation potential will  have to  be  scrutinised.  This requires  that 
special  attention  be  paid  to  policies  in  the  areas  of product- and  services-market competition, 
taxation, state aids and the labour market, while fully respecting the principle of  subsidiarity.  Such 
an exercise of multilateral surveillance of structural factors would be a natural complement to the 
on-going  macroeconomic  multilateral  surveillance.  It  would  aim  to  ensure,  not  only  the 
sustainability of EMU,  but also  its  success  in  terms of deeper integration and  a more  solid and 
flexible economic union. 
At the Community level, simplification and modernisation is going on.  In  its work programme for 
1998, the Commission will notably draw conclusions from the second phase ofthe pilot scheme for 
the  simplification of legislation  for  the  internal  market  (SLIM)  and  the  work of the  Business 
Environment  Simplification  Task  Force  (BEST)  with  a  view  to  simplifying  administrative 
formalities and easing regulatory constraints, especially for SMEs.  In  1998, the Commission will 
launch phase III (dealing with legislation related to  social security rights and  insurance markets) 
and phase N  of  SLIM. 
The Internal Market and overall globalisation exert a strong pressure to improve competitiveness, 
but the latter is also linked to national or Community policies in the field of  R&D and, notably, the 
information society. The logistic environment of firms is also critical for a smooth development of 
trade relations and warrants a strengthening of efforts in TEN and national infrastructure projects 
both  in  keeping  an  adequate  share  of public  investment  in  overall  public  expenditure  and  by 
searching for joint ventures with the private sector where appropriate. 
Finally,  the opening-up of the  markets of third countries  for  both  goods  and  services  from  the 
European Union can have an important impact on job creation.  Barriers to market entry in  third 
countries for  services are  a frequent  case,  white at  the  same  time  advances  in  communications 
technology  make  many  more  services directly tradable  across  borders.  Restrictions on  inward 
investment  and  inadequate  protection  of intellectual  property  rights  also  weaken  European 
industry's  capacity  to  penetrate  foreign  markets  and  reduce  the  returns  on  past  intangible 
investments.  Significant  progress  to  open  third-country  markets  has  been  made  through  the 
Uruguay Round and WTO. Effective implementation of this agreement along with enlargement of 
the Union to the Central and Eastern European Countries constitute significant levers for action of 
the European Union. 
4.5.  Policies for efficient labour markets 
The European Union has developed a strategy in the field. of employment based on two pillars. At 
the economic policy level, including macroeconomic and structural elements, the Broad Economic 
Policy  Guidelines  define  an  overall  policy  mix  favourable  to  growth  and  employment  in  the 
stability framework of EMU and this aspect should be strengthened in the future, in agreement with 
the Resolution on "Growth and employment" adopted by the Amsterdam European Council. At the 
same time, in anticipation of the Employment Title of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council adopted 
in  December  1997  Employment  Guidelines  for  labour  market  policies.  These  Employment 
Guidelines are co-ordinated with the  Broad Economic  Policy Guidelines  in  order to  make them 
consistent and mutually supportive. They will also be transposed into National Action Plans, which 
will be discussed for the first time at the Cardiff European Council in June 1998. 
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•  Improve the "employability" of  manpower; 
•  Promote entrepreneurship; 
•  Encourage the adaptability of  firms and workers; 
•  Strengthen the policies for equal opportunity. 
From an economic viewpoint, the first line of action (employability) covers all policies (training 
and  improvement  in  human  capital,  active  measures  in  favour  of the  young  or  long-term 
unemployed) which aim at avoiding tensions on the labour market particularly when unemployment 
starts  to  fall  significantly during  the  growth  process  and  at  making  better  use  of the  growth 
potential offered by the labour reserve.  The conditions for the sound working of these measures 
have already been dealt with in section 2.3 above. 
The second line of  action (entrepreneurship) is closely linked to reforms on the product and service 
market (section 4.4 above) and is  directly concerned with the most important bottleneck on the 
labour market at present, i.e. the insufficient creation of  new job posts. 
Finally,  allied  to  equity  objectives,  the  last  two  areas  of  action  (adaptability  and  equal 
opportunities) aim  at increasing the employment rate  and at making growth more employment 
creating. The third line of action (adaptability) seeks to encourage a more dynamic approach to 
improving the employment situation by making enterprises more productive and competitive.  This 
includes,  notably,  actions  by  governments  and  the social  partners  aimed  at modernising  work 
organisation (including  working time,  new forms  of contracts,  etc.)  while  achieving the  right 
balance between flexibility and security.  The fourth line of action (equal opportunities) aims at 
increasing  the  employment  rate  by  tackling  gender  gaps,  reconciling  work  and  family  life, 
facilitating  reintegration  into  the  labour  market  and  promoting  the  integration  of people  with 
disabilities into working life. 
As regards the  increase in  the  labour content of growth,  structural reforms have the effect that 
apparent labour productivity grows more slowly, so that more jobs could be generated for a given 
rate of GOP growth.  Obviously, the purpose is neither to hamper productivity at the sectoral or 
company level, nor to reduce the organisational and technical progress, since it would be damaging 
for competitiveness and general welfare. In this reasoning, the slowdown in  the apparent labour 
productivity at the macroeconomic level may result from: 
(i)  less substitution of labour by capital; 
(ii)  a greater sharing of working time (reorganisation and reduction of working time,  including 
part-time jobs). 
(i)  Slowdown of  labour by capital substitution via a widening ofthe wage scale 
As  already  presented  in  section 2.4,  from  a  macroeconomic  viewpoint,  a  process of moderate 
overall wage increases, within a given wage structure, and which does not distribute the increase in 
productivity coming from capital-labour substitution into real wages, as happened in  1982-89 and 
1992-96, would act in the right direction but will take some time to bring significant effects, unless 
the moderation is very intense. On the other hand, these substitution effects would be completed 
with strong, immediate, profitability effects thanks to the reduction in real unit labour costs. The 
latter,  in  tum,  have a  powerful potential  impact on employment in  making  possible a  stronger 
classical, investment-supported, growth exceeding the productivity trend when demand prospects 
are good. 
An  alternative  approach  would  be  to  assume  that  the  wage  scale  could  be  strongly  opened, 
especially downwards.  At  present,  it  is  deemed  that  the  EU economies  are  not  using  all  the 
employment opportunities, especially in  low-skilled, low-productivity activities that are presently 
priced out of the market by too high wage costs.  Should the conditions be created permitting the 
19 full  use  of these  opportunities,  re-introducing  in  the  production  process activities  with  below-
average  productivity  would,  all  other  things  being  equal,  entail  a  reduction  in  the  apparent 
productivity of  labour. 
There are  basically two  ways to  "price  in"  activities with  excessive  wage costs  relative  to  the 
productivity level in the activity concerned. 
•  Widen the waie distribution downwards - In order to reach its target, a downward widening of 
the wage scale would imply a fall in the wage cost of low-skilled activities by about 20 to 30 
percent,  as  happened,  for  instance,  in  the  United  States  during  the  1970s  and  1980s. 
Furthennore, in order to be efficient, the downward extension of the wage distribution would 
require  in  Europe  a  corresponding  lowering  of unemployment  compensations  and  social 
· protection schemes in order to eliminate the so-called "poverty trap". 
This would, ceteris paribus, widen the income distribution towards larger inequality and, at the 
limit, would create "working poor" groups, unable to survive decently from their wages. Such 
an  evolution  would  introduce  in  Europe  a  fonn  of exclusion just as  damaging  for  social 
cohesion as unemployment and it is worth noting that in the United States, these consequences 
are  now deemed lo ·be sufficiently serious for  warranting  a  switch  towards  a  less  extreme 
system  and  welfare  support  in  the  form- of the  so-called  "Earned-Income Tax Credit". In 
Europe, this would mean that part of  the saving in unemployment compensation would have to 
be  switched to  other fonns of social transfers and  would therefore not alleviate the  public 
budget constraints. 
This fonn of  wage-cost reduction would thus be difficult to apply in the EU although pragmatic 
collective agreements between the social partners,  including entry level wages for the  long-
tenn unemployed, may make some contribution to it. 
•  Reduce non-Waie labour costs - In  most countries, social security contributions fonn by far 
the largest part of taxes on labour.  Often they have a complex structure which, besides their 
undesirable aspect of  a tax on the use of  labour, also makes them weigh relatively more heavily 
on low wages. Furthennore, these systems were created as an expression of social solidarity at 
a time when the number of contributors was high (low unemployment and a high employment 
rate),  budgets  were  balanced  and  the  degree  of solidarity  could  increase.  At  present,  the 
employment  rate  and  thus  the  number  of contributors  has  fallen  (cf.  section  2.2),  social 
expenditures are growing and significant reductions in the degree of generosity are politically 
difficult to implement. This resulted in a vicious circle of ever-increasing social contributions 
and tax wedges on a decreasing proportion of  working persons in the total number of potential 
beneficiaries. For instance, the share of social security contributions in GOP, which was about 
10.5  per cent in  1970  is presently at about  16  per cent for the EU as a whole and represents 
only a part of  the total tax wedge in overall wage costs. 
Initially, between 1970 and  1981, the increase in the tax wedge went together with an increase 
in total labour costs per unit of output, i.e. the share of the overall wage bill in GOP.  Indeed, 
during those years,  the wage  share  in  GOP  increased  by 4.6  percentage  points.  However, 
between  1981  and  1997,  the  strong wage  moderation  has  more  than  compensated  for  this 
increase.  Between 1981  and  1997 the wage share in GOP decreased by 6 percentage points, 
bringing wage costs per unit of output below their level of 1970.  Thus, the increase in the tax 
wedge has been totally passed on to wage income.  This evolution is expected to continue in the 
near  future,  thereby  contributing to  a  further  improvement  in  profitability  (see  section  3  .4 
above). 
But,  in  spite of this favourable  development of overall  labour costs  per unit of output,  it  is 
indisputable that,  at the  individual  level, the tax wedge remains very high and  is  especially 
20 harmful at the low end of the wage scale where it causes pricing-out of the market for low-
skilled, low-pay jobs and an increase in "black market" activities. 
Given the dimension of  the tax wedge, there is room for a cut in wage costs for the employers 
without reducing the net wage income of wage earners. However, a general, across the board, 
reduction would have no more effect on  unit labour costs than  a few years of further wage 
moderation but would either imply a strong reduction of social benefits or have a high budget 
cost  which  would  go  well  beyond  the  automatic  stabiliser  effects  of a  lower  number  of 
unemployed. This reduction would thus need to be compensated for by  other fiscal  reforms 
(including, where appropriate,  higher environmental taxes)  which  should  of course have  as 
little negative side effects (in terms of  inflation, for instance) as possible, a constraint that is not 
easy to satisfy. On the other hand, cuts in the tax wedge would be most efficient when targeted 
at specific labour force groups at the low end of  the wage scale (young workers, long-term low 
skilled unemployed) where their impact might be more substantial, especially when combined 
with active labour market measures in education, apprenticeship schemes, vocational training 
and  re-training,  etc.,  which  could  be  partly  financed  by  using  social  transfers  such  as 
unemployment benefits in a more active way and new forms of partnerships with the private 
sector. In that way, the budgetary consequences may remain within manageable limits.  In this 
context and to maximise the employment impact, care needs also to be taken to reduce as much 
as possible substitution and dead-weight effects resulting from targeted cuts in the tax wedge. 
These reductions of the tax  wedge  should  be  inserted  in  the  general  reforms  of the  social 
security systems and the tax structure that are needed for many other reasons (ageing, explosion 
of  health expenditure, elimination of"poverty traps", introduction of  environmental taxes, etc.). 
Thus, a sustained attention to the relationship between wages and productivity, integrated into the 
normal  process of collective wage negotiations,  combined with  fiscal  reform where  applicable, 
would help to make growth more employment creating by fostering market conditions conducive to 
the return, and the development, of  activities currently priced out of  the market and by reducing the 
"black" economy
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• 
(ii) Reduction in working time 
The secular reduction in the number of  hours worked in industrial countries has undoubtedly been a 
factor of  social progress and welfare in this century. But it must be noted that most progress in this 
field was made during periods of  fast growth and high employment and were part of  a "work versus 
leisure" choice. The trend is, in fact, nothing more than a distribution of productivity growth, with 
lower working times and less growth in  real income. A return to this secular trend when growth 
recovers may therefore be expected and would be quite normal and welcome as an improvement in 
working conditions and quality of  life. 
In  periods of recession and high unemployment, however, it is often put forward that a massive, 
across the board, compulsory reduction in  working time would be the fastest and most efficient 
solution for a significant reduction of unemployment. This approach, in fact considers the amount 
of work available to be somehow fixed and that the only way to reduce unemployment is thus to 
redistribute it over the whole labour force, with less hours worked per individual. 
Such a solution nevertheless raises a number of  questions: 
12  A slowdown of  capital for labour substitution could for instance result from well-designed me~ures  supporting pent-
up demand for new activities, notably in services to persons and communities, without a fall in the productivity level 
of  existing production. 
21 •  A compuiiiOI')' reductioll in wodila time may have adverse consequences in firms where labour 
and  capital  are  ued in  a  fiUcl  proponicm  at  a  given  point  in  time.  If the  finn  is 
orpaisatioaally unable to ...w-m die total number ofboun worked (throup adctitional hiring 
andlor decouplina betwllll labour baun lllCl capital boun), its productive capacity is likely to 
be  reduced, eva if  productivity per hour iDcreues
13  somewhat.  This entails a reduction  in 
poteDtial output powth (i.e.  in the potential creation of wealth and income) which could be 
neptive in 1he laq  nm for empla)'mnt. 
•  If  cme wants tO avoid a demriontiao of  prafitability which would neptively affect investment 
and thu compreu even  more  the productiw potential, the arowth  of real  waps per capita 
would have to be adjulect~  in order to avoid a deterioratioa in real unit labour costs. 
Such a reduction may be difticult to obtailt l8d cause severe and conflicting piroblems in terms 
of  income diltribution. 
However,  this  should  aot  exclude  speciftc  measures  of  working  time  reduction  at  the 
microecoDOIDic level wheN it is warram.d by local conditiona, nqotiated by the social partners 
and is either reversible or can be ..n u  illtepated into the secular trend of reduction in working 
time. 
In this context, 10me iaitiativw s...-rmat  meuures combining a reduction of  working time with 
job creation and fiscal advaDtaaes eould llltait positive results. 
Another aPProach for iDcmasiq the labour coatmt of  growth would be to encourage, if  need be by 
revisioa  of existina  legislatioll,  the- maximum  use  of vollllflary  part-time  and  new  forms  of 
employment.  The pouibilitiel.in that field are obviously very different in Member countries &iven 
the very large differeaeos in the proportioa of  s-t--time workers that one may observe at preseDt. 
11  This is the ..;or .,_  why a reduc:tioa of  WDitciq hears would ave to be lipificlnt in order to have a positive 
~etrect. 
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The EuropNn economy M-Key lndlcatoN 
(% chlnge p.a. If not~  Indicated) 
I  FOIWCUtl Autumn 
1887 
81-73  74-15  M-10  11-88 11110  1881  1882  1113  1114  1115  1118  1117  1118  1111 
lconomlo growlh. (Nil,.  chlngt  p;a.) 
Private coneumptlon  4.11  2.2  3.7  1.5  2.1  2.2  1.8  -0.3  1.7  1.8  2.1  2.1  2.5  2.8 
Government canaumpllon  3.8  2.5  2.0  1.1  2.1  1.8  1.5  1.2  0.3  0.11  1.0  0.8  1.2  1.5 
G101111xed C8pltal formation  11.7  -0.1  5.7  -0.1  3.8  -0.4  -0.1  -8.8  2.5  3.8  1.3  2.8  4.7  11.11 
of which equipment  2.1  7.2  0.0  11.4  0.2  -3.7  -11.11  4.3  7.11  3.0  4.11  8.3  7.0 
of which CCinltrUCIIon  ·1.0  4.1  -0.1  3.4  -0.3  1.1  -3.7  1.2  1.3  0.0  1.2  3.3  4.2 
Exporta of goodl•nd MMcll1 ' 1  8.0  4.3  5.0  11.3  8.8  5.0  3.7  1.7  1.0  7.1  4.7  7.1  7.4  7.2 
lrnportl of gooda 8nd Hl'llc881 ' 1  8.7  2.8  7.4  3.1  8.1  4.1  3.1  -3.0  7.7  8.7  3.1  8.7  7.0  7.2 
GOP  4.8  2.0  3.3  1.5  2.1  1.5  0.1  -0.5  2.1  2.4  1.8  2.8  3.0  3.1 
.,.._.... CoMponenta: ColllrlbUIIOn toc~U~n~~t  IIJGDP C't) 
Consumption  3.8  1.7  2.8  1.1  2.1  1.8  1.4  0.0  1.1  1.2  1.5  1.4  1.7  1.8 
lnveetment  1.3  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.8  -0.1  -0.2  ·1.4  0.11  0.7  0.3  0.5  0.1  1.1 
Stockbulldlng  0.0  -0.1  0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.4  -0.1  -0.11  0.1  0.2  -0.3  0.2  0.1  0.0 
Dornatlc demand  4.1  1.8  3.8  1.1  2.8  1.2  1.0  ·1.1  2.11  2.1  1.4  2.1  2.7  2.1 
Exports~,  0.4  0.1  0.8  0.3  0.3  0.4  1.4  0.1  0.1  0.1  1.4  1.1  1.1 
Fl1181  deln8nd'~ 1  2.1  3.1  1.1  3.1  1.5  1.11  -0.4  3.4  3.0  2.3  3.11  3.1  4.1 
lmporta1~1 (mlnul)  -0.1  -0.8  -0.4  -0.2  0.0  -0.5  0.0  -0.11  -0.11  -0.8  -0.1  -0.1  -1.0 
Netuportl  0.4  -0.11  0.4  0.1  0.2  -0.1  1.4  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.11  0.2  0.1 
lhlnlt  .-~m~wt~nMt  In "'or GDP 
PrMte MCtor  21.2  21.1  20.8  20.1  20.8  20.1  20.8  21.0  21.3  21.7  20.7  11.1  11.8  11.8 
of which houllholdl1 ' 1  10.3  12.5  10.0  1.1  1.8  10.0  1.1  8.3  8.7  8.8  1.11  8.1  7.1  7.7 
of which enlilrpriMI''1  10.1  Ul  10.8  11.8  11.0  10.1  11.5  11.7  12.8  12.8  12.2  11.8  11.8  12.1 
G8nn  government  4.1  0.5  0.2  ·1.7  0.2  -0.4  ·1.7  ·2.7  -2.3  -1.8  ·1.3  -0.2  0.4  0.1 
N811on81 uvingl  211.3  21.8  21.0  11.2  21.0  18.7  11.1  11.3  11.0  18.1  18.4  11.8  20.2  20.7 
G1011 C8JIIWI formdon  24.7  21.8  20.8  18.4  21.7  21.1  20.1  18.4  11.0  11.4  18.7  11.7  11.0  18.4 
Current 8CCCIUnt  0.4  -0.4  0.1  -0.3  -1.0  -1.1  ·1.7  -0.1  0.0  0.8  0.1  1.3  1.4  1.4 
Detllnnl ...  of lnveebnent 
Cap8City utlllutlon rdo  83.1 
80.81 
84.11  82.11  80.11  77.7  78.8  83.0  81.21  82.0 
GDPQ8P  -1.1  1.1  -1.3  2.2  1.2  -0.2  -2.7  -2.0  -1.7  ·2.1  -1.7  -1.1  -0.8 
Prollt8blllty lnd8x (1881-73•1 00)  100.0  72.1  H.1  14.8  10.11  10.0  10.11  18.2  88.8  11.8  102.8  107.0  111.0  113.8 
Growtlt po&ilntl8l 
C8plt8IIOutput rdo  (CIGDP)  3.0  3.3  3.3  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.4  3.3 
C.plt8llntenllty  4.11  2.8  1.2  2.8  1.2  2.5  4.0  3.1  2.3  1.4  1.8  1.11  1.3  1.1 
Growth of C8Pit8lltock (.-)  4.1  2.1  2.11  2.2  2.1  2.8  2.11  1.1  1.1  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.4 
GOP growth (1'111)  4.8  2.0  3.3  1.5  2.1  1.5  0.8  .0.5  2.8  2.4  1.8  2.8  3.0  3.1 
Productivity growth (GDP/pera.empl.)  4.4  2.0  1.1  2.0  1.2  1.3  2.4  1.4  3.3  1.1  1.5  2.1  2.1  1.11 
l!mplorlnent 8lld Unllnployment 
Employment  0.3  0.0  1.3  -0.4  1.7  0.1  -1.4  ·1.1  -0.4  0.11  0.2  0.11  0.8  1.3 
Activity Rat8 u "'  of pop.15-84  87.3  87.8  87.8  88.3  88.1  87.8  . 87.8  87.8  87.7 
Employment rUI (llenc:llnWk) c•t  %  117.11  85.2  81.3  80.1  82.8  82.7  81.8  80.4  80.1  110.3  80.3 
•  (1180)  (1174) 
Employment 111t1, fiM.tlme ~  •  117.0  118.0  58.0  118.0  117.0  115.8  115.1  115.2  1111.0 
Unemployment 11118 % of 8CtiYe pop. 1 "1  2.3  8.4  8.1  10.2  7.7  8.2  9.3  10.7  11.2  10.8  10.9  10.7  10.3  8.8 
PrtcMMd .....  =-ngel,. 
9.9  12.4  8.2  4.7  7.8  7.1  7.0  4.1  3.4  3.2  3.4  3.2  3.2  3.5 
5.0  1.11  1.9  0.8  2.8  1.4  2.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.8  1.1  1.0  1.2 
Nomln8l unit 18bour COitl  11.3  10.2  4.2  2.7  8.3  5.7  4.11  2.7  0.1  1.3  1.1  1.1  1.0  1.8 
RMI unit lllbour cotta  0.0  -0.3  -0.8  -0.1  0.9  0.2  0.0  -0.9  ·2.4  ·1.8  -0.11  -0.8  -0.1  -0.8 
GOP dell8tor  5.2  10.8  4.9  3.8  11.4  5.5  4.11  3.8  2.8  .  2.9  2.4  1.8  2.0  2.2 
Prtv8te conaumpllon dell8tor  4.7  10.7  4.3  3.9  4.9  11.8  4.7  4.0  3.3  3.0  2.8  2.1  2.2  2.2 
Terms of trade  0.4  ·1.3  1.7  0.2  0.8  0.4  1.2  0.1  -0.7  -0.4  0.3  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1 
o.n.r.t  go¥8111ment ......_, %of  GDP 
Expenditure  48.3  41.2  50.9  41.2  49.4  50.8  112.4  51.3  111.0  50.4  41.7  47.8  47.1 
Current revenuea  42.7  44.11  411.8  44.7  45.2  45.8  48.3  45.9  45.9  48.1  48.0  45.8  45.3 
Net borroWing  3.8  3.3  5.0  3.11  4.2  5.1  8.1  5.4  11.1  4.2  2.7  2.2  1.8 
Net borrowing cycllc8lly 8djult8d  3.4  3.9  4.8  5.2  11.3  5.11  11.1  4.8  4.7  3.8  2.1  2.0  1.9 
D8bt  114.9  811.7  1111.3  118.0  80.4  88.0  87.9  70.9  73.0  72.3  71.3  89.7 
lloMI8ry  CCIItclltloM 
L.ong-t.rm lntlrelt,.... (1)  9.8  8.8  11.1  10.3  1.8  7.8  8.2  8.3  7.1  8.2  8.1  8.2 
Short-t8nn lnt8relt ..... (2)  1.8  8.2  11.7  11.0  11.2  8.8  8.8  8.7  5.1  4.8  4.4  4.11 
Yield curve (1·2)  0.0  0.4  -0.8  -0.7  -1.4  -0.8  1.11  1.8  2.0  1.8  1.7  1.7 
~  lntnlt  ..... 8djllltld for.  4.7  11.0  5.4  4.8  5.1  4.0  5.4  5.5  4.8  4.2  3.3 
lntldan111 
DEMIUSD  3.78  2.38  1.84  1.117  1.81  1.88  1.58  1.811  1.82  1.43  1.110  1.711  1.81  1.80 
Nomtn8l .nr.ctlve exctllnge ....  0.3  -4.1  11.1  ·1.8  12.8  -3.7  2.5  ·12.11  ·2.2  3.8  2.3  -4.8  0.4  .0.2 
RUI 8lf8c:tlve exctllnge 11118  93.3  95.5  93.11  911.8  103.0  100.0  104.7  82.7  89.8  92.8  14.9  89.2  88.3  87.1 
(Index: 1991•100) 
,., EU Including the new Germlln Lander from 1111; for peR:ent8ge c:tl8ngel from 1112. 
'"
1 Including lntr8-EU ncle.  1 ' 1 Exlra-EU trllde. 
1 ' 1 EUR12 untii1H3. 
,., 1180 llgure from the lldcln8l 8CCDUnll (Ameco). 
1 "1 Euraa18t dellnlllon. 
Ill Prlv8ll CCIIIIUIIIPIIon clllllltor. 
111 GOP delllltar. 
~  Comrnllllon .mo.. Table 2 
Main Economic Indicators, 1995·1999 (Autumn 1997 forecasts) 
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PO!)ula-
Uon 
10.2 
5.3 
82.2 
10.6 
39,3 
S8.6 
3.6 
56.8 
0.4 
15.& 
8.1 
9.4 
5.1 
8.9 
59.0 
373.1 
207.6 
125.9 
GOP 
national 
CUITti\Cy 
(bin) 
~22 
1078 
3656 
32679 
77389 
8151 
•9 
194M20 
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17843 
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1745 
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8074 
s12n1 
GOP In 
ECU (bin) 
212.6 
144.0 
1862.6 
10S.6 
466.6 
1230.9 
65.7 
1009.6 
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90.0 
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201.-5 
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1995  1996  1997  1998 
1.4 
4.4 
2.1 
3.2 
3.1 
1.8 
6.4 
1.9 
3.2 
2.0 
2.0 
1.5 
4,8 
2.3 
1.5 
2.1 
2.3 
2.2 
1.1 
2.6 
0,8 
3.4 
1.4 
0.9 
8.4 
0,4 
1.9 
3.5 
1.5 
3.3 
3.3 
0.0 
2.7 
1.4 
3.0 
4.6 
1.7 
4.4 
1.2 
4.1 
2.5 
1.0 
7.6 
1,5 
3.8 
3.4 
1.4 
4.6 
3.8 
1.0 
4.0 
2 1 
4.0 
0.2 
2.3 
3.3 
2.4 
4.1 
3.9 
2.7 
6.7 
2.2 
1.3 
3.0 
2.1 
3.9 
3.3 
2.4 
3.1 
2.8 
2.8 
2.2 
GOP 
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EUR•100 
113,0 
117.1 
109.5 
66.2 
77.5 
106,1 
103.7 
102.41 
161 .7 
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109.6 
69.2 
99.8 
99.5 
98.6 
100.0 
144,7 
118.0 
1999 
2.4 
3.2 
3.1 
4.3 
4.2 
2 9 
7.• 
2 7 
2.9 
3.0 
2.7 
4.0 
3.2 
2.9 
2A 
3.0 
2.3 
2.8 
G rot.~  flx4M:I capltal fonnation In equipment at c:oneblnt pt'tces 
{annual% change} 
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5.0 
5.3 
7.7 
11.5 
8.9 
4.2 
9.0 
6.0 
-9.5 
3.9 
7.5 
7,5 
1,9 
5.5 
6.0 
6.3 
10.9 
6.1 
5.3 
4.9 
8.8 
11.8 
8.4 
6.1 
12.0 
7.0 
5.0 
6.5 
7.5 
7.0 
6.0 
5.1 
4,1 
7.0 
6.6 
7.1 
6 
OK 
0 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
U K 
EUR 
USA 
JAP 
B 
OK 
0 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
U K 
EUR 
USA 
JAP 
B 
OK 
0 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
EUR 
USA 
JAP 
1995 
2.1 
2.8 
u 
2.0 
2.8 
2.1 
11.1 
2.9 
3.8 
2.3 
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(annual%  c-hange) 
1996  1997  1998 
1.5  2.4 
'2...1  3.5 
1 4  2.5 
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2.3  3.3 
1 5  2.3 
8.6  8.6 
0.7  1.4 
3.0  3.4 
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3.3  4.6 
1.1  2,1 
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2.8  3.6 
3.5  1.3 
Oeftator of private consumption 
{annual %  c.h~nge) 
3.0 
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3,1 
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2.5 
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4.0 
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2.3 
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1.7 
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1.9 
9.3 
4.7 
1.6 
2.0 
5.8 
0.7 
1.5 
1,4 
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0.3 
~4 
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3.0 
2.2 
-0.5 
~3 
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3.3 
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2.& 
2.4 
0.2 
1.7 
2.1 
2.1 
8.0 
2.1 
1.3 
1.4 
2.2 
1.6 
2.1 
1.9 
2.2 
1.3 
1.8 
2.4 
2.1 
2.1 
1.5 
1.8 
2.5 
2.2 
4.5 
2.2 
1.5 
2.5 
2.2 
1.7 
2.4 
2.1 
2.1 
2.0 
2.0 
2.4 
2.2 
2.4 
1.1 
Com.J)fl'tiUOn of  tmploy ...  P«  Mad 
(l nftUI.I % Ct\lngt) 
1995  1996  1997  1998 
2.9 
3.6 
3.8 
12.5 
2.2 
2.5 
1.6  ... 
2.2 
2,1 
3.1 
4.5 
4.0 
2.9 
2.4 
3.2 
3.5 
1.6 
1.4 
3.1 
2.5 
11.5 
4.4 
2.8 
2.2 
5.5 
1.8 
2.0 
1.7 
5.7 
3.6 
7.3 
3,5  ,_. 
3.4 
0.8 
2.3 
3,8 
2.0 
10.5 
2.7 
2.4 
5.5 
5.3 
3.3 
3.2 
1.7 
4.7 
2.4 
4.5 
4,2 
3.2 
3.2 
1.2 
2.6 
4,4 
2.5 
7.5 
3.0 
2.7 
5.3 
3.2 
3.3 
3.6 
2.3 
4.1 
2.6 
3.9 
4,3 
3.2 
3.8 
2.4 
1999 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3,9 
3.6 
3.1 
7.6 
2 8 
4.0 
3.3 
3.3 
3.7 
3.6 
3,3 
2.3 
3.1 
2.5 
2.9 
1999 
1.8 
2.7 
2.2 
3.5 
2.3 
2.0 
3.0 
2.0 
1.8 
2.6 
2.2 
23 
2.0 
2.3 
2.3 
22 
3.0 
1.0 
1999 
2.6 
4,6 
3.0 
9.1 
3.1 
3.2 
5.3 
3.3 
3.4 
3,6 
2.8 
4.2 
3.0 
3.9 
4.2 
3.5 
5.2 
2.8 
Note: M  usual. tt'le forec.a:s1 s are conditioned upon, intet aJ!a. tl'le t6Chnical as$Umption o1  ·no policy c::l\af\Oe'. This means tl\at specific polity measures, especially in 
the buelgttaty ~ld . wftich have not yet been dis.dos.ed are noc  t:~.ken into acc:ount. As a r0$ul!, P'Oitaion• ~r  1999 are euentlaU y an •xttapolation Of expected 
trends in 1997/98, 
~Commission seMces. 
2 Table 2 continued. 
Main Economic Indicators, 1995-1999 (Autumn 1997 forecasts) 
Hum•  of untft\91oyed u  Y. of~~  c:IY!Iitn labOur tore• 
B 
OK 
0 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
EUR 
USA 
JAP 
B 
OK 
0 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
EUR 
USA 
JAP 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
9.9 
7.2 
8.2 
9.2 
22.9 
11.7 
12.3 
11.9 
2.9 
6,9 
3.9 
7.3 
16,3 
9.2 
8.7 
10.8 
5.6 
3.1 
u 
6.9 
6,9 
9.6 
22.1 
12.4 
11.8 
12.0 
33 
6.3  ... 
7.3 
15,4 
10.0 
8.2 
10.9 
5.4 
3.4 
9,7 
8.0 
tO.O 
9.5 
21.0 
12.5 
10,8 
12.1 
3.6 
5.5 
4,4 
6.8 
13.8 
10,4 
64 
10.7 
s.o 
3.3 
6.6 
54 
9.8 
9.3 
19.8 
\2.3 
9,5 
11.9 
3.6 
48 
4.2 
6.1 
12.6 
9.9 
56 
10.3 
4,7 
3.1 
Bllanee of  r;urrent trllnNCtlona 
( ..  a%oiOOP) 
1995  1996  1997  1998 
4.5 
0,8 
-1.2 
·2.7 
0 ,4 
1.5 
4,5 
2.4 
t7.2 
5.5 
-2., 
·2.0 
4.1 
1.1 
-1.9 
0.6 
-1.9 
2.2 
4.5 
08 
-1.2 
·2.6 
0.3 
1.6 
3.6 
3.5 
16.0 
5.7 
-1.8 
-2.5 
3.8 
1.2 
.0.1 
0.9 
-1 7 
1.4 
5.0 
0.2 
-0.8 
-2.9 
1.0 
2.4 
' 3.3 
3.7 
14.8 
5,4 
-1.8 
.2_.1& 
3.7 
1.9 
0.0 
1.3 
-1 .9 
2.3 
5.4 
0.3 
.0,2 
-3.0 
0.5 
2.5 
2.9 
40 
11t2 
5.4 
-1.4 
-2.3 
4.9 
2.2 
•• 5 
1.4 
·2,0 
2.5 
80 
5.1 
9.1 
9.2 
18.7 
11.9 
7.9 
11.8 
3.9 
3.9 
3.9 
6.3 
11.7 
9.3 
•• • 
9.7 
5.1 
3.1 
1999 
5.7 
0.4 
-0.2 
-3.1 
0.1 
2.8 
1.4 
4.4 
17.0 
5.5 
-1.3 
·2.4 
5.9 
2.6 
·0.7 
1.4 
·1.9 
2.3 
Cyclically od)uotocl lending (+) or  bC>IY'C>Wing (-1 of 9tMI'Il 
government (as • % of GOP) 
B 
OK 
0 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
EUR 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
·3.3 
·1.8 
·3.2 
-9,1 
-8.2 
-4.4 
-2.1 
-7.9 
-3 3 
-5.0 
-'6 
-3 1 
-8.3 
·50 
-4.7 
·2.2 
-03 
-2.7 
-6,9 
-3.5 
-3.3 
-1.0 
-8.2 
2.2 
-1.9 
·3.41 
-2.3 
-1.8 
-VI 
-4,5 
-3.& 
41.9 
1,3 
-2.3 
-3.8 
-2.1 
·2.• 
-0.5 
-2.3 
1.7 
·1.8 
·2.2 
-2.1 
·1,3 
-0.7 
·22 
·2.1 
·2.1 
1.6 
·2.2 
·3,0 
-2.0 
·2.8 
-0.1 
-3.3 
1.4 
·2.1 
·2.1 
·2  1 
-06 
0.3 
.0.7 
-2.0 
·2." 
1 8 
· 1.6 
·3.1 
·2.2 
·2.1 
08 
-3.7 
08 
4 1.8 
·2  .• 
·2.2 
-0.2 
-0.2 
·03 
·\.9 
B 
OK 
0 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
N l 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
EUR 
USA 
JAP 
B 
OK 
o" 
EL 
e• 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL'* 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
EUR 
USA 
JAP 
B 
O K'' 
0 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
Nl 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
EUR 
1995 
OS 
1.8 
·0.3 
0.9 
1.7 
1.0 
4.8 
·0.2 
2.5 
1 4 
0.2 
·1.0 
1.7 
1.5 
1.2 
0.6 
1.5 
0.2 
Total.mploym.nt 
(annual '%chine-) 
1996  1997  1998 
0.0 
1.1 
·1.2 
1.3 
1.S 
0.0 
3.7 
0.2 
2.4 
1.8 
-0.7 
0.6 
0.9 
-0.6 
1.2 
02 
1.4 
•• 
0.2 
2.2 
·1.3 
1.6 
2.5 
0.3 
4,5 
0.1 
1.8 
1.9 
0.0 
1.5 
2.4 
·1.1 
1.5 
0,$ 
2.4 
1.2 
1.1 
0.9 
0,3 
1.7 
2.4 
1.1 
3.8 
0.3 
2.2 
2.0 
0.7 
0.7 
1,8 
0.7 
0.5 
0.8 
1.8 
1.0 
Gonorat goo ommant not ltndlng{+) or bo<Towtng{4 
(ISI%oiGDP) 
1999 
1.0 
0.8 
1.5 
1.8 
2.5 
1,4 
4.0 
0.5 
2.2 
2.0 
1.3 
0.6 
1.5 
1.2 
0.5 
1.3 
0.9 
1.2 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
·3,9 
·2.4 
~3.3 
·9.8 
·7.3 
·5.0 
·2. 1 
·8.0 
2.0  .... 
·5.0 
·5.8 
·5.0 
-7.1 
·5,5 
-5.1 
·2.3 
-3.7 
-3.2 
.0.8 
-3.4 
·1.6 
-4.7 
-4.1 
-0,4 
-8.8 
2.& 
·2.3 
·3.8 
·3.2 
-3.1 
·3.7  .... 
-4.2 
·1.4 
-4.4 
·2.8 
1.3 
-3.0 
-4.2 
·2.9 
·3.1 
0,5 
-3.0 
1.& 
•2.1 
·2.8 
•2.7 
·1.4 
·1.9 
·2.0 
·2.7 
-0.3 
·3.4 
·2.3 
1.9 
·2.6 
-3.0 
·2.4  .... 
1,2 
-3.7 
1.0 
·1.9 
·2.& 
•2.4 
-0.2 
.0.2 
.0.8 
-2.2 
0.3 
~3.0 
Ctnttll gowmment grosa debt 
( ..  a% oiOOP) 
1995  1996  1997  1998 
131.2 
73.8 
58.0 
111 .3 
65.3 
52 5 
82 2 
12  • .  4 
5.9 
79.1 
69.3 
66,5 
58.1 
78.2 
53.8 
71.0 
126.9 
71.6 
60.4 
112.6 
70.1 
55.7 
72.7 
123.8 
6.6 
772 
695 
655 
sa.  a 
77.8 
54.4 
73.0 
124.7 
67.0 
&1.7 
109.3 
68.1 
57.3 
65.8 
123.2 
6,7 
73.4 
66.1 
62.5 
590 
77.4 
52.9 
72.4 
121.3 
62.2 
61.4 
106,4 
88.5 
58.2 
59.2 
121.9 
6,9 
71.5 
65,6 
60.8 
57.3 
75.3 
51.5 
71.4 
·2.2 
2.4 
·1.7 
-2.7 
·2.2 
·2.6 
2.1 
·3,6 
0.5 
·1 5 
·2.4 
·2.2 
0.5 
0.2 
.0.3 
·1.8 
0.8 
·2.5 
1999 
117.7 
57.0 
eo.o 
104.2 
84.8 
$8.2 
52.3 
120.0 
78 
69.4 
64.8 
59,5 
55.8 
71.2 
49.8 
69.8 
,.  Not including umflcation related debt and asset assumpboni by the federal government In 1995 (Treuhand, eastern housing companies and Deutsche Kreditbank), 
equal to OEM 227.5 On. 
11 Fisiures complying with Eurostat's recommendanons of February 1997 es1abltsh1nq a common and hannonised inlE!fJ)I'etation of the rules oC ESA t"' ec:Ubon  The 
figures for 1995 and  1m  are 6.4% of GOP 
lt  Not Including tor 1995 a net amount 0132,84 on NI.G 01 exceptiOnal txpend•ture related 10 the refOtm of the llnanaog of the social hOuSing societies. 
-•Government  depoSllS Vo11h the central bank, government hOidngs ot non-gcwemmen1 bOnds and public enterpnse related debt amounled to some 16%  01 GOP In 
1$Q&. 
3 
'  \ Table 3 
Economic policy-mix in the EU: favourable to growth and employment 
Real effective 
Chart9e in  Change in 
Change in  Nominal  Nominal unit  Real on.it labour  short-term  long-term 
exchange rate •>  interest rates  interest rates  cyclicaHy·  compensation  labour cost  cost sJ 
(Untt labour costs)  sinceQ1  since 01  adjusted budget  per employee 
(t993 = 100)  1995  1995  balanee.tt 
(3-month  (til-year 
Interbank)  bencl1mar1<) 
Percentage change 
0 1  04 
Jan 1998  Jan 1998 
1996197 
1998  t997'1  t99s'1  1997"  1998
4
'  1997'1  1998~  1995  1997  annual 
average 
B  107.2  98.7  ·2.2  ·3.3  0.7  -0.2  2.3  2.6  0.1  0.7  ·1.2  ·1.1 
OK  102.9  102.6  -2.5  ·3.7  1.6  0.3  3.9  4.3  2.5  1.9  -0.2  -0.8 
0  106.3  92.0  -1.5  -2.5  0.4  0.2  2.0  2.5  -1.7  -0.4  -2.5  -2.0 
EL  110.6  128.2  1.1  n.a  2.7  0.8  10.5  7.5  8.1  5.6  1.7  0.7 
E  90.7  91.8  -4.3  -6.5  2.1  0.1  2.7  3.0  2.0  1.9  0.1  -0.3 
F  102.8  98.4  -3.0  -3.1  1.0  ·0.4  2.4  2.7  0.4  0.7  -0.8  -0.6 
IRL  95.3  91.4  -0.6  -3.4  0.8  0.4  6.5  5.3  1.1  1.1  -0.3  0.4 
I  88.2  101.6  ·3.8  -6.6  2.8  ·1.0  5.3  3.2  4.0  1.0  1.4  ·1,0 
NL  103.2  97.6  -1.6  -2.7  0.8  -0.3  3.2  3.6  2.0  1.9  0.1  -0.4 
A  104.7  95.5  -t.O  -2.5  1.4  0.1  1.7  2.3  -0.2  0.2  -1.5  ·1.4 
p  108.6  106.2  -5.5  -6.3  1.3  0.0  4.7  4.1  2.6  1.1  ·1.0  -1.2 
FIN  113.9  106.1  -2.5  -4.9  0.9  0.7  2.4  2.6  0.3  0.5  -0.6  -1.6 
s  97.3  108.9  -3.6  ·5.2  2.8  1.0  4.5  3.9  1.2  1.7  -0.7  -0.3 
UK  99.2  119.6  0.8  ·2.6  1.5  1.5  4.2  4.3  2.3  2.7  -0.4  0.0 
EUR'1  101.6  96.2  ·2.1  ·3.6  1.3  0.1  3.2  3.2  1.1  1.1  -o.7  -o.9 
USA  102.6  115.0  -0.6  ·2.0  0.2  .(J,1  3.2  3.8  2.0  3.0  -0.1  0.1 
" Relative to 22 industrialised countries. 
2
• A minus sign.{ndicates a deterioration, I.e. a rls.e in the deftclt 
"• Deflated by GOP deflator. 
••european Commission Autumn 1997 forecast 
5
• Exchange rate relative to 9 industrial non.-EC countries. 
~Commission  services  and OECO. 
4 Table4 
Labour market situation, EUR1
> 
1115  11H  1117  1111  1111  1110  1911  1112  1113  1114  1115  1111 
a) Non IICtlvlty rate, u  % of  33.8  33.3  33.0  32.7  32.3  32.2  31.7  31.9  32.4  32.4  32.4  32.3  population 15-84 year 
(a •  100-b) 
b) Activity rate, aa % of  66.4  66.7  87.0  "87.3  87.7  87.8  68.3  68.1  87.8  87.8  87.8  87.7  population 15-84 year 
(b.  c+t) 
c) Employment me,  59.8  60.1  60.5  81.1  82.1  82.8  82.7  81.8  80.4  60.1  60.3  60.3  benchmark Hrlea, % of 
population 15-84 year (c) 
d) Full-time equivalent 
employment rate 21  55.8  58.0  58.3  56.9  57.7  58.0  58.0  57.0  55.8  55.1  55.2  55.0 
e) Effect of part-time  4.0  4.1  4.2  4.2  4.4  4.8  4.7  4.8  4.8  5.0  5.1  5.3  employment ( PC-d) 
f) Unemployment rate, aa %  8.8  8.8  8.5  8.2  5.6  5.2  5.8  8.3  7.2  7.5  7.3  7.4  of population 15-84 year 
(f-b-c) 
g) Unemployment rate,  10.0  9.9  9.7  9.1  8.3  7.7  8.2  9.3  10.7  11.2  10.8  10.9  as % of civilian labour 
force31 
11 V1rlab1H c, d 1nd g 1re orlglnlllnput. Other v1rllbles •re dlrlved from theM. 
2lraklng Into ICCOUnt .,.rt-tme 1nc:l over-tine In relation to nltlonlllegillltive number of working houl"l per week. 
31 Definition Euroahll 
~  Cornmlulon Hrvlcel. 
5 Table 5 
Labour market situation, Individual Member States 1, 
B  OK  D  EL  E  F  IRL  L  NL  A  P  FIN  S  UK  EUR 
11U  40.8  16.7  32.0  38.3  43.7  31.0  38.1  41.9  34.0  37.1  30.2  30.5  20.9  17.4  25.3  33.6 
1110  41.4  15.9  30.8  39.5  40.8  30.9  38.2  40.9  27.8  33.7  27.9  30.8  22.6  15.7  22.2  32.2 
103  38.2  18.5  30.5  39.6  40.3  31.8  37.5  41.2  22.3  32.4  28.1  29.1  28.5  19.9  23.8  32.3 
1111  37.2  18.9  31.3  37.0  39.4  31.2  38.2  41.8  18.2  30.5  27.0  28.8  27.1  21.9  24.0  32.3 
b) Activity~  u%ot  population 11-&1 year (b • c+f) 
1115  59.2  83.3  88.0  61.7  58.3  89.0  61.9  58.1  88.0  82.9  69.8  89.5  79.1  82.8  74.7  88.4 
1110  58.8  84.1  69.2  80.5  59.4  89.1  81.8  59.1  72.2  86.3  72.1  69.4  77.4  84.3  77.8  87.8 
103  81.8  83.5  69.5  60.4  59.7  88.4  82.5  58.8  77.7  87.8  73.9  70.9  73.5  80.1  78.4  87.7 
101  82.8  81.1  68.7  83.0  80.8  88.8  83.8  58.4  81.8  89.5  73.0  71.2  72.9  78.1  78.0  87.7 
c) Employment ma, benchmarkurtea,% of  pOpUlation 11-M y•r(c) 
1111  53.1  77.4  63.1  57.3  44.1  82.0  51.4  53.1  84.1  57.7  87.3  83.5  74.3  80.1  88.2  59.8 
1110  54.7  77.8  88.3  58.8  49.7  82.8  53.5  53.7  71.0  82.2  89.7  88.2  74.9  82.8  72.4  82.8 
103  58.3  75.1  84.0  55.2  48.1  60.4  52.7  52.7  75.8  83.2  70.9  88.9  81.1  72.5  88.5  80.4 
11H  58.8  75.5  62.8  58.9  47.2  80.3  58.3  51.4  79.1  85.1  89.8  88.0  81.7  70.3  89.8  80.3 
d) Full-time equivalent employment rate a1 
1115  50.9  87.8  58.9  55.8  42.8  59.1  49.7  52.3  54.3  47.8  83.5  61.9  70.7  70.6  58.0  55.8 
1110  51.7  68.3  80.8  55.4  48.4  59.8  51.3  52.8  53.0  50.2  85.8  84.5  71.2  72.8  83.2  58.0 
103  52.7  88.1  59.1  54.1  44.4  58.7  49.8  51.8  52.8  50.8  88.8  84.8  58.1  83.8  59.1  55.8 
1111  52.7  67.3  57.0  55.6  45.1  58.1  53.0  50.2  51.0  51.7  85.0  63.8  58.5  83.3  59.8  55.0 
1881 
1880 
1883 
1811 
2.2  9.8  4.2 
3.0  9.3  5.7 
3.8  9.0  4.9 
3.9  8.2  5.6 
e) Effect of part-time employment rate ( .-e-el) 
1.5  1.3  2.9  1.7  0.8  9.8  10.1  3.8  1.6  3.6  9.5  8.2  4.0 
1.2  1.3  3.3  2.2  0.9  18.0  12.0  3.9  1.7  3.7  10.0  9.2  4.6 
1.0  1.7  3.7  2.9  1.0  23.1  12.4  4.1  2.0  3.0  8.8  9.4  4.8 
1.3  2.1  4.2  3.3  1.2  28.1  13.4  4.8  2.2  3.2  7.0  10.0  5.3 
f) Unemployment rate, a• % of population 15-84 year (r-k) 
1881 
1880 
1883 
18H 
6.1  5.9  4.9  4.4  12.2  7.0  10.5  5.0 
3.9  6.5  2.9  3.9  9.7  8.2  8.3  5.4 
5.5 
8.2 
8.4  5.5  5.2  13.8  8.0  9.7  6.1 
5.8  6.1  6.1  13.4  8.5  7.5  7.0 
1.9 
1.2 
5.2 
4.1 
2.1  4.5 
2.7  4.4 
2.5  6.0 
2.4  3.2 
4.8 
2.5 
3.0  4.0  12.4 
3.2  5.2  11.2 
2.5 
1.5 
7.6 
7.8 
8.5 
5.4 
7.9 
6.2 
6.8 
5.2 
7.2 
7.4 
g) Unemployment rate, ••  % of civilian labour force
3
' 
1885  10.3  7.1  7.2  7.0  21.6  10.1  16.9  8.5  2.9  8.3  3.6  8.7  6.0  3.0  11.5  10.0 
1980  6.7  7.7  4.8  8.4  18.2  8.9  13.4  9.1  1.7  8.2  3.2  4.6  3.3  1.8  7.0  7.7 
1983  8.9  10.1  6.0  8.6  22.8  11.7  15.8  10.3  2.7  6.6  4.0  5.7  16.9  9.5  10.4  10.7 
1811  9.8  6.9  8.8  9.6  22.1  12.4  11.8  12.0  3.3  6.3  4.4  7.3  15.4  10.0  8.2  10.9 
11 Variables c. d and g are original input. Other variables are derived from these. 
21 Taking into account part-time and over-time In relation to national legislative number of working hours per week. 
31 Definition Eurostat. 
~  Commluion services. 
6 Table6 
Growth, employment and productivity trends, 
EUR, USA and Japan 
(Aver.ge annual growth rates, In %) 
1881-73  1874-881  1874-81  1888-88 I 
1188·80  1881-88 
··1, RlafGDP QftMih 
EUR  4.7  2.2  2.0  2.3  3.2  1.5 
USA  3.9  2.4  2.3·  2.5  2.8  2.1 
JAP  9.6  3.3  3.7  3.0  4.6  1.7 
2.. LabOUI-•upply 
EUR  0.3  0.6  0.7  0.4  0.9  -0.1 
USA  1.9  1.7  2.1  1.3  1.5  1.1 
JAP  1.2  1.0  0.9  1.2  1.4  0.9 
3. ·EihploymMt· 
EUR  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.3  1.4  -0.5 
USA  1.9  1.7  1.9  1.5  1.9  1.1 
JAP  1.3  0.9  0.8  1.1  1.5  0.6 
EUR  4.4  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.9  2.0 
USA  1.9  0.7  0.5  1.0  0.9  1.0 
JAP  8.1  2.4  3.0  1.9  3.1  1.1 
s  •. ·T«*t'faotor.·PfOd~ 
EUR  2.8  1.1  1.0  1.2  1.5  1.0 
USA  1.6  0.6  0.4  0.8  0.9  0.8 
JAP  6.3  1.1  1.4  0.7  2.0  -0.3 
•~ Labout:toctPIIII:aubatltutlona 
EUR  1.6  0.9  1.0  0.8  0.4  1.0 
USA  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2 
JAP  1.8  1.3  1.6  1.1  1.1  1.3 
11 Re•l GOP per employed person. 
21 Ave.-.ge of Clpbl•nd l•bour productivity, weighted by t.ctor income sh•res In GOP. 
11 Ollcrep.ncy betwMn l•bour produdlvlty •nd totlll f8c:tor proctudlvity. 
~  Commlulon aervtcea. 
7 Table 7 
General government net lending I borrowing (% of  GOP) 
Convergence programme projections 
Dat.tl  11H  1117  1118  11H  2000  2001· 
B  1197  -3.4  -2.9  -2.3  -1.7  -1.4 
OK  6197  -1.4  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.1 
2) 
03)  1197  -3.9  -2.9  -2.5  -2.0  -1.5 
EL  7197  -7.4  -4.2  -2.4  -2.1 
E  4197  -4.4  -3.0  -2.5  -2.0  -1.6 
F  1197  -4.0  -3.0  -2.8  -2.3  -1.8  -1.4 
IRL  4197  -0.9  -1.5  -1.5  -1.1 
I  6197  -6.7  -3.0  -2.8  -2.4  -1.8 
NL  12196  -2.6  -2.2  -2.25 
A  10197  -4.0  -2.7  -2.5  -2.2  -1.9 
p  3197  -4.0  -2.9  -2.5  -2.0  -1.5 
FIN  9197  -3.1  -1.3  -0.1  0.3  1.0  1.9 
54)  9/97  -2.5 (-3.7)  -1.9 (-1.6)  0.6  0.5  1.5 
UK  51  9/97  -4.2  -1.6  -0.3  -0.1/0.4  0.511.5  0.912.4 
1) Date when moat rKent version of convergence prog~WT~me  Will submitted. 
2) Government aurplua of 2.8% of GOP projec:tecl for 2005. 
3) Taking into account reviHd estimates (for 1888 and 1997) provided by the Gennan authorities In 
February 1997. 
4) Main aerlea according to SWIIdlah natlonalaccounta, figures in brackell for 1996 and 1997 according to 
ESA accounting principles. 
5) Financial year ending In March of the following calendar year. 
~  Commlulon HrYic:el. 
8 Table 8 
Receipts and expenditures of  general government - EUR a ) 
(in% of GOP) 
1181  1870  1873  1882  1888  1883  1884  1885  1888  1887 
cu,.trecelpW 
1. Total (2+3+4+5)  34.3  37.4  38.2  44.3  44.8  41.3  41.8  45.1  41.1  48.0 
of  which: 
2. Indirect taxes  13.9  13.5  12.9  13.2  13.5  13.6  1.3.8  13.7  13.8  14.0 
3. Direct taxes  8.7  10.2  10.7  12.4  13.3  12.9  12.6  12.8  12.8  12.9 
4. Social security 
10.2  10.7  11.8  14.7 
contributions 
14.6  16.0  15.9  16.0  16.1  15.8 
5. Other current receipts  1.5  2.9  2.8  4.0  3.4  3.8  3.5  3.4  3.4  3.3 
Total expenditure 
6. Total (7+8+9+10+11)  33.8  38.1  38.7  41.3  47.2  52.4  51.3  51.0  50.4  48.7 
of  which: 
7. Current transfers  11.5  14.7  16.0  21.6  20.7  23.7  23.5  23.3  23.1  22.5 
7bls. of  which: 
Households  12.1  13.0  17.9  17.1  20.0  19.9  19.8  19.7  19.3 
8. Actual interest payments  3.1  1.8  1.7  4.1  4.6  5.4  5.2  5.4  5.4  5.0 
9. Public consumption  13.7  15.4  16.4  19.6  18.2  19.6  19.2  19.0  18.9  18.7 
10. Net capital transfers  0.8  0.7  0.9  1.0  0.9  1.1  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.3 
11. Groaa capital formation  4.5  4.2  3.7  2.9  2.8  2.8  2.7  2.5  2.4  2.2 
Memory ltema 
I 
12. Gross saving (1-7-8-9)  6.0  5.2  4.1  -1.0  1.2  -2.4  -2.1  -1.8  -1.3  -0.2 
13. Net lending(+)/ 
0.7  0.3  -0.6  -5.1  borrowing(-) (1-6) 
-2.4  -6.1  -5.4  -5.1  -4.2  -2.6 
14. Gross public debtb>  65.2  38.8  35.3  45.8  54.1  66.1  68.1  71.1  73.2  72.8 
a) 1961  : EUR 15 excluding Greece, Portugal, Auatrla, Sweden and Finland; 1970: EUR15 excluding Greece, 
Portugal and Finland, 1973 : EUR 15 excluding Luxembourg, Greece and Portugal. 
b) 1970: EUR 15 excluding Denmark, France, the Netherland• and Portugal1973: EUR 15 excluding France and the 
Netherlands. 
~  Commission urvlces. 
9 Table 9 
Sectoral change In the EU 1, 
(% p.a.) 
Indicator  Ptftod  Total  Agriculture  lnclu8try'  S.rvlca 
Value added  1961-73  4.9  1.8  5.5  5.6 
1Q74-85  2.0  1.4  1.5  2.7 
1988-90  3.2  1.3  2.6  3.4 
1991-94  1.1  0.9  0.1  1.8 
Employment  1961-73  0.3  -4.6  0.5  1.6 
1974-85  0.2  -2.9  -1.6  1.7 
1988-90  1.2  -3.3  -0.2  2.0 
1991-94  -0.8  -3.8  -3.3  0.5 
Labour 
productivity  1961-73  4.6  6.5  5.0  4.0 
1974-85  1.8  4.3  3.1  1.0 
1986-90  2.0  4.6  2.8  1.4 
1991-94  1.9  4.7  3.4  1.3 
Relative prlca  1961-73  0.0  -0.4  -1.0  0.7 
1974-85  0.0  -2.6  -0.7  0.6 
1986-90  0.0  -1.6  -1.3  0.8 
1991-94  o.o·  -6.1  -1.4  0.7 
._latfve,.welghtof vllueaddect(ln% oftotaUn current prlcH) 
1960  7.6  35.5  41.3 
.  1973  4.8  33.7  49.5 
1985  3.0  29.4  58.9 
1990  2.6  26.9  60.1 
1994  2.0  24.3  63.5 
Occupled-f'OPUIIUolttperactor(ln% of'total) 
1960  15.9  30.8  41.4 
1973  8.6  31.6  49.1 
198S  6.0  26.6  59.0 
1990  4.8  23.9  61.7 
19G4  4.2  21.6  65.0 
'1 EUR15 excluding GIMCI, Spain, Ireland, LUXIImbourg and  Portugal. For the period 1981-73 
comparable dati II  only avaHable for EUR5 (Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy and the 
Netherllnd8) and for 187U!  EUR 8 (Belgium, Denmark, W•t  Germany, France, Italy, Finland, 
sw.den, the UK). 
11 Excluding building and conatruc:tlon. Table 10 
W•g• dlaperalon In the EU 
B 
OK 
03) 
EL 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
A 
p 
FIN 
s 
UK 
EUR12 
USA 
1'  ECHP·'  ·  .. -~··•·· 
OvWI· 
.....  1  .. 
(OM»} 
2.42 
2.10 
2.95 
2.50 
3.64 
3.20 
4.18 
2.13 
3.38 
2.33 
n.a. 
4.20 
n.a. 
n.a. 
3.73 
3.05 
n.a. 
~--
-~-
2.25 
2.17 
2.32 
n.a. 
n.a. 
3.28 
n.a. 
2.80 
n.a. 
2.59 
3.66 
4.05 
2.38 
2.13 
3.38 
n.a. 
4.39 
1) EC HouHhold Panel. 
2)  (09101) •  (09105) • (05101) 
1l  ·ICHP·'::.-·  ......  ____  ·.···"It 
·  ..  ·.· .  ...,. 
<  .  . ·  ... 
1.64 
1.53 
1.78 
1.80 
2.04 
1.98 
2.00 
1.52 
1.94 
1.82 
n.a. 
2.83 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1.94 
1.83 
n.a. 
3)  OECD data referring  to Weatem Germany only. 
1.57 
1.57 
1.81 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1.99 
n.a. 
1.80 
n.a. 
1.66 
1.82 
2.47 
1.70 
1.59 
1.87 
n.a. 
2.10 
.  1l 
ECHP' 
~....,  ........ 
(05101-) 
1.47 
1.37 
1.88 
1.58 
1.78 
1.82 
2.08 
1.40 
1.74 
1.44 
n.a. 
1.60 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1.92 
1.88 
n.a. 
·~--·  ···-·iift  .·  (DWIJ 
1.43 
1.38 
1.44 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1.65 
n.a. 
1.75 
n.a. 
1.58 
2.01 
1.64 
1.40 
1.34 
1.81 
n.a. 
2.09 
Note: Baed on (provlalonal) data of the ECHP-94, the eamlnga dispersion have been calculltld on 
nonnal groa monthly earnings (for NL : net monthly earnings) for full-time employees.  Figures 
are ratios of upper/lower decllel In the distribution of earnings. The ratios for EU12 have been 
calculated  11 the sum  of the dilperllon rates  for  each  Member  States,  weighted  with  the 
reapectlve shire In total employment (from Labour Force Survey 1994). 
~  Commilllon Hrvlc:el and OECD. 
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16 E-;~h~aJ  Employment rates and employment 
creating growth - EUR 
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